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ARTICLE
TORTURE, IMPUNITY, AND THE NEED FOR
INDEPENDENT PROSECUTORIAL OVERSIGHT OF
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Fran Quigley*
Allegations of Executive Branch misconduct present an inherent
conflict of interest because prosecutorial discretion is invested in a U.S.
Attorney General appointed by-and serving at the pleasure of-the
President. Various commentators, including Justice Antonin Scalia,
Professor Stephen Carter, and the many critics of the former indepen-
dent counsel statute have posited that checks on executive power pro-
vided by the Legislative Branch, the Judiciary, and political pressure will
overcome any potential conflicts of interest.
This sanguine view of adequate Executive Branch oversight was put
to the test when high-level members of the George W. Bush Administra-
tion authorized acts of torture. After widespread public disapproval,
Congress and the courts responded with efforts to rein in the Administra-
tion's actions. However, the Department of Justice under the Bush Ad-
ministration not only refused to investigate and prosecute allegations of
sanctioning torture, but its attorneys also led the efforts to overcome
congressional, judicial, and popular resistance to the Executive Branch
conduct-and did so while explicitly acknowledging that the Executive
Branch could expect little or no judicial oversight for its actions. Ulti-
mately, the President who sanctioned torture left office, and the voters
elected a President who expressed sharply different views on torture.
However, the subsequent Administration of President Barack Obama, al-
though affiliated with a different party and on record as opposed to acts
of torture sponsored by the previous Administration, has also declined to
pursue prosecution of high-level members of the Bush Administration.
This most recent development shows that the conflict of interest
presented by presidential control over Executive Branch prosecution
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transcends predictable concerns of self-preservation. The conflict of in-
terest also highlights the natural desire of a sitting President to avoid
prosecutions of previous executive officials when such prosecutions
would consume political capital needed for the President's broader leg-
islative and foreign policy agendas. When it comes to controlling Execu-
tive Branch criminal conduct, the current structure designed to provide
checks and balances comes up empty and thus must be reformed. The
most direct and effective reform would be the direct election of the U.S.
Attorney General. Even less precise remedies, such as a revived and
improved independent counsel or Congress enacting provisions to break
up the current monopoly over Executive Branch prosecution, would be
significant improvements over the current system, which mocks the prin-
ciple of equal justice for all.
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INTRODUCTION
The control that the President of the United States holds over the
appointment and removal of the Attorney General, who is entrusted with
prosecutorial oversight over the President and his top appointees,
presents a clear conflict of interest and calls into question the claim that
no U.S. officeholder is above the law. Under two very different presi-
dential administrations, Bush Administration officials have enjoyed im-
punity for sanctioning acts of torture. This fact debunks the argument
that countervailing interests and powers in the Legislative and Judicial
Branches of government, and the political process, reduce the conflict of
interest inherent in presidential control over the Attorney General.
Part I of this Article evaluates the sanguine view of the federal
prosecutorial conflict of interest in the context of the Bush Administra-
tion's sanctioning of torture. Part I reviews the historical and legal basis
for an attorney general beholden to the President and uncovers the fact
that the founders were not at all wedded to the idea of President-con-
trolled federal law enforcement. Part III discusses the empirical evi-
dence demonstrating that more prosecutorial independence would lead to
better governance and less corruption. Part IV analyzes different options
for reform, particularly (1) direct election of the Attorney General, (2)
revival of an independent counsel position that remedies the flaws of the
Independence Counsel Act, and (3) various proposals for breaking up the
Attorney General's monopoly on prosecutions of the Executive Branch.
I. U.S. EXECUTIVE BRANCH IMPUNITY UNDER AN "IN-HOUSE"
ATTORNEY GENERAL
A. The Bush Administration and Torture
By 2008, members of President George W. Bush's Administration
had been implicated in so many alleged criminal activities that a popular
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news website, Slate, created a multi-color, interactive graphic to chart
possible criminal charges against high-level Executive Branch officials
for activities such as approving torture, illegally wiretapping U.S. citi-
zens, and politicizing Department of Justice hirings and firings.' The
existence of such an array of possible criminal activity by a two-term
administration is less remarkable than the fact that, in a country that
prides itself in being a nation "of laws and not men," 2 none of these
accusations had led to the prosecution of a single high-level Executive
Branch official.3
A particularly notorious example of unprosecuted criminal activity
in the Bush Executive Branch was the explicit and repeated authorization
for agents of the Central Intelligence Agency to physically and psycho-
logically abuse al-Qaeda suspects. During the Bush Administration, the
Department of Justice officially approved the following acts:
* Slamming suspects into walls,
* Slapping and grabbing suspects,
* Placing detainees in "confinement boxes" for up to eighteen
hours,
* Placing insects in the confinement boxes with detainees,
* Compelling detainees to remain in "stress positions" for unspeci-
fied amounts of time,
* Depriving detainees of sleep for as many as eleven days at a
time, and
* Waterboarding, which produces the sensation of drowning and
suffocation.4
1 See Emily Bazelon et al., Crimes and Misdemeanors, SLATE (July 24, 2008, 6:55
AM), http://www.slate.com/id/2195892/.
2 See, e.g., MASS. CONST. Pt. 1, art. XXX. John Adams authored the famous statement
of the rule of law. See John Adams and the Massachusetts Constitution, Sup. JUD. CT., http://
www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/john-adams-b.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2010).
3 See Mark Thompson, Obama's Growing Dilemma on Torture Prosecution, TIME, Apr.
22, 2009, http://www.time.com/time/politics/article/0,8599,1893023,00.html. A special prose-
cutor was appointed to investigate the destruction of evidence of CIA interrogations during the
Bush Administration, but no charges have yet been filed. See Mark Mazetti, Grand Jury
Inquiry on Destruction of C.I.A. Tapes, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2009, at A14.
4 CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SPECIAL REvIEw:
COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACTivrrmEs (SEPr. 2001-Ocr. 2003) 21
(2004), available at http://luxmedia.com.edgesuite.net/acluIGReport.pdf [hereinafter CIA
OIG REP.]. Waterboarding is described as follows:
[T]he individual is bound securely to an inclined bench... . A cloth is placed over
the forehead and eyes. Water is then applied to the cloth in a controlled manner. As
this is done, the cloth is lowered until it covers both the nose and mouth. Once the
cloth is saturated and completely covers the mouth and nose, the air flow is slightly
restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth. ... [A]n increase in
the carbon dioxide level stimulates [an] increased effort to breathe. This effort plus
the cloth produces the perception of "suffocation and incipient panic," i.e., the per-
ception of drowning.. . . During those 20 to 40 seconds, water is continuously ap-
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According to a heavily redacted 2004 report from the Central Intel-
ligence Agency Office of the Inspector General,5 made public in 2009,
the Department of Justice issued these guidelines, and CIA agents fol-
lowed them.6 According to the report, CIA agents used the waterboard-
ing technique on one suspect 183 times in a single month7 and on another
suspect eighty-three times in a single month.8 They used larger volumes
of water than prescribed while attempting to block the detainees' air
flow.9 In addition, detainees were threatened with a power drill and
handgun,10 told that their daughters and mothers would be sexually
abused in front of them," and that their children would be killed if an-
other attack occurred on the United States after 9/11. 12 CIA agents also
choked detainees, 13 subjected them to mock executions, 14 left them in
extreme cold while shackled and naked,15 and beat them with rifle butts
and large metal flashlights. 16 CIA officials subsequently briefed senior
Bush Administration officials on the Agency's use of "enhanced interro-
gation techniques," and the CIA officials reassured Bush Administration
officials that the Department of Justice approved the conduct.17
plied from a height of [12 to 24] inches. After this period, the cloth is lifted, and the
individual is allowed to breathe unimpeded for three or four full breaths. . . . The
procedure may then be repeated. . . . [T]his procedure triggers an automatic physio-
logical sensation of drowning that the individual cannot control . . . [I]t is likely that
this procedure would not last more than 20 minutes in any one application.
Id.
5 The Inspector General of the CIA is a position created by Congress to conduct inde-
pendent investigations, inspections and audits, and report accordingly to both the CIA director
and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence. The Inspector General is statutorily mandated to provide both semi-annual
reports and immediate reports of "serious or flagrant problems" within the Agency. See 50
U.S.C. § 403q(d)(2) (2006).
6 CIA OIG REP., supra note 4, at 24.
' Id. at 91.
8 Id. at 36.
9 Id. at 37 (stating that the "waterboard technique employed ... was different from the
technique as described in the DoJ opinion and used in the SERE training").
10 Id. at 41-42 (classifying the use of the Handgun and Power Drill under the list of
"Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques").
1 I CIA OIG REP., supra note 4, at 42-43.
12 Id. at 43.
13 Id. at 69.
14 Id. at 70.
Is Id. at 75.
16 Id. at 79. U.S. military personnel at Guantanamo Naval Base used similar techniques
against detainees including stripping detainees naked, threatening them with dogs, depriving
them of sleep, and making detainees wear dog leashes and perform dog tricks. See STAFF OF
S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVS., 11OTH CONG., INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN
U.S. CusToDY xxi (2008), available at http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/supporting/2008/De-
tainees.121108.pdf [hereinafter ARMED SERVS., DETAINEE TREATMENT].
17 See CIA OIG REP., supra note 4, at 101.
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In order to back up this informal reassurance, the Department of
Justice issued six formal memoranda between August of 2002 and De-
cember of 2005.18 In each memorandum, the Department concluded that
the CIA's proposed or existing interrogation techniques were fully law-
ful19 and, in the process, ignored well-settled definitions of what consti-
tutes the illegal act of torture.20 Furthermore, Executive Branch officials,
including cabinet members and the President himself, approved and en-
dorsed these techniques.21 As the Senate Armed Services Committee
later concluded:
The abuse of detainees in U.S. custody cannot simply be
attributed to the actions of "a few bad apples" acting on
their own. The fact is that senior officials in the United
States government solicited information on how to use
aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the ap-
18 See THE TORTURE MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE UNTHINKABLE 3 (David Cole ed.,
2009) [Hereinafter TORTURE MEMOS].
19 See id. at 4.
20 See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Jus-
tice, Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards
of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee
Memo], in TORTURE MEMOS, supra note 18, at 41 (concluding that an act is not torture unless
the pain inflicted is "equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury,
such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death"). This definition was not
in line with established domestic and international definitions of the term. See supra note 16;
see also Mike Allen & Dana Priest, Memo on Torture Draws Focus to Bush, WASH. POST,
June 9, 2004, at A04 (noting that the DoJ definition of torture differed from the Army's defini-
tion of torture). Moreover, Jack Goldsmith, a subsequent Assistant Attorney General in the
Office of Legal Counsel, repudiated the definition two years later. See Jeffrey Rosen, Con-
science ofa Conservative, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 9, 2007, at 42. Among the reams of prece-
dent ignored in the August 2002 memo was the fact that the act of waterboarding alone had
resulted in multiple criminal convictions of local and foreign defendants in U.S. tribunals. See
Scott Horton, Justice After Bush: Prosecuting an Outlaw Administration, HARPER'S, Dec.
2008, at 49.
21 See Jan Crawford Greenburg et al., Bush Aware of Advisers' Interrogation Talks,
ABC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2008), http://abcnews.go.comiTheLaw/LawPolitics/story?id=4635175&
page=l&page=l (quoting President Bush as saying in reference to "enhanced interrogation
techniques": "Well, we started to connect the dots in order to protect the American people.
And yes, I'm aware our national security team met on this issue. And I approved."). Specifi-
cally, President Bush's February 7, 2002 memorandum stated that the Third Geneva Conven-
tion did not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda, and that Taliban detainees were not entitled to
prisoner of war status or the legal protections provided by the Third Geneva Conventions
"opened the door" to subsequent mistreatment of prisoners. See ARMED SERVS., DETAINEE
TREATMENT, supra note 16, at xiii. Members of the President's cabinet and other senior offi-
cials, including Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Attorney General John Ashcroft, Di-
rector of Central Intelligence George Tenet and then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza
Rice were personally involved in the review and approval of the interrogation techniques. See
id. at xv, xix, xxvi; see also Dan Eggen, Cheney's Remarks Fuel Torture Debate, WASH. POST,
Oct. 27, 2006, at A9 (citing Vice President Dick Cheney's statement that approving
waterboarding was a "no-brainer for me"); Jan Crawford Greenburg et al., supra.
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pearance of their legality, and authorized their use
against detainees.22
These acts of torture are contrary to express provisions of U.S. law
that prohibit "cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment" of detainees. 23
As has been outlined in great detail elsewhere,24 these acts of torture and
the sanctioning of torture also violate Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, 25 the Convention Against Torture,26 Article 7 of the Inter-
22 ARMED SERVS., DETAINEE TREATMENT, supra note 16, at xii.
23 See, e.g., Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd (2005).
24 See, e.g., TORTURE MEMOS, supra note 18, at 6-40; Daniel Kanstroom, On
"Waterboarding": Legal Interpretation and the Continuing Struggle for Human Rights, 32
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 203, 210-11 & n.37 (2009); Seth F. Kreimer, Torture Lite, "Full
Bodied" Torture, and the Insulation of Legal Conscience, I J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y
187, 201-25 (2005); Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate Interna-
tional Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 811, 838-62 (2005) [hereinafter Paust, Executive Plans]; Phillipe Sands, Torture Team:
Abuse, Lawyers, And Criminal Responsibility, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 353, 356-57 (2009); Bob
Woodward, Detainee Tortured, Says U.S. Official: Trial Overseer Cites "Abusive" Methods
Against 9/11 Suspect, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2009, at Al (quoting Susan J. Crawford, conven-
ing authority of military commissions to the U.S. military, who concludes that the United
States tortured Saudi national Mohammed al-Qahtani at Guantanamo); Owen Fiss, The Exam-
ple of America, YALE L.J. POCKET PART 4-5 (May 1, 2009), available at http://yale-
lawjournal.org/images/pdfs/764.pdf.
25 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War,
art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. Rati-
fied unanimously by the Senate in 1955, the common Article 3 prohibits parties to the treaty
from committing certain acts upon prisoners, including "violence to life and person, in particu-
lar murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture . . . outrages upon personal
dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment." Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 3, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 UN.T.S. 135.
26 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, art. 2(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [Hereinafter Convention Against Tor-
ture]. The Convention states that each party to the treaty "shall take effective legislative,
administrative, judicial or other measures" to prevent acts of torture or other acts of cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment in any territory under its jurisdiction. See id.
In other words, the United States has accepted an affirmative obligation to investigate and,
where appropriate, prosecute acts of torture; see also 136 CONG. REc. S 17,491 (daily ed. Oct.
27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum) ("The Torture Convention . . . . [W]ould send a
powerful signal to torturers around the world that the United States will not tolerate its prac-
tice."). The Supreme Court has ruled that intentional infliction of physical or emotional harm
in order to obtain information from a detainee "shocks the conscience" and thus violates the
Due Process Clause. See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 774-75 (1994). The May 30,
2005 memorandum from the Department of Justice to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy General
Counsel, CIA, acknowledges that the "shocks the conscience" standard governs the legality of
interrogation methods. See Memorandum from Stephen J. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assis-
tant Atty. Gen., U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, to John A. Rizzo, Senior
Deputy General Counsel, C.I.A., Re: Application of United States Obligations Under Article
16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interro-
gation of High Value al-Qaeda Detainees (May 30, 2005) [hereinafter Bradbury Memoran-
dum], in TORTURE MEMOS, supra note 18, at 227-28.
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national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,27 and Article 5 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 28 each of which the U.S. has
ratified. Further, the Geneva Conventions and the Convention Against
Torture expressly require the United States and other parties to the trea-
ties to investigate allegations of human rights violations and prosecute
the offenders. 29 As Professor Jordan Paust writes, "Never in the long
history of the United States has there been such widespread serial crimi-
nality authorized and abetted at the highest levels of our government."30
The lack of prosecution for crimes like these may surprise students
of U.S. civics that are taught that even powerful officeholders are not
above the law. 3 ' But students of human nature, not to mention those of
rational choice theory (which depicts human beings as largely maximiz-
ers of their own self-interest), 32 might expect an absence of criminal
charges, given the powerful self-interests working against prosecution.
The United States grants the Attorney General a monopoly on the power
to prosecute Executive Branch officials but simultaneously requires him
27 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 173 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), ratified by U.S. Senate Resolution of
Advice and Consent to Ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
102d Cong. (1992) (enacted), 138 CONG. REc. 8070 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). The U.S. Senate
ratified this treaty subject to reservations that the prohibited activities were the equivalent of
those already prohibited under the Fifth, Eight and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Consti-
tution. See id.; see also 138 CONG. REc. S4,783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) (statement of Sen.
Moynihan) (noting that the Covenant "reflects the principles articulated in our own Bill of
Rights").
28 G.A. Res. 217A, at 73, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec.
10, 1948) ("No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.").
29 See Convention Against Torture, supra note 26, at art. 6; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 146, Aug, 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
75 U.N.T.S. 973.
30 Jordan J. Paust, The Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and Appropriate
Sanctions, 43 VAL. U. L. REv. 1535, 1575 (2009) [hereinafter Paust, Absolute Prohibition].
31 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) ("The Government of the
United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men."). States
often require students to study Marbury. See, e.g., COLO. MODEL CONTENT STANDARDS: CIV-
ics 12-13 (2008), available at http://www.cde.state.co.us/cdeassess/documents/OSA/stan-
dards/civics.pdf (recommending that high school students learn about Marbury in connection
with separation of powers and judicial review); GEORGIA DEP'T OF EDUC., SoCIAL STUDIES,
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT/CIVICs, STANDARDs 3 (2004), available at https://www.georgiastan-
dards.org/standards/Georgia%20Performance%20Standards/American%20Government%2020
09-2010%208-14-2008.pdf (stating that students are taught Marbury in the context of learning
how the decision "established the Supreme Court as an independent, coequal branch of
government").
32 See, e.g., GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 5-14
(1976).
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to oversee the Department of Justice,33 whose Office of Legal Counsel 34
was at the core of the torture crimes.35 Complicating this conflict, the
Attorney General serves at the pleasure of a President who controls the
entire Executive Branch of government. 36
Thus, under the U.S. Constitution and current statutory scheme, the
ironies-and the conflicts-abound. Despite being labeled "America's
lawyer"37 and subject to ethical rules prohibiting her from showing fa-
voritism in any prosecution decision,38 the Attorney General has the
closest possible organizational ties to a potential target of prosecution by
serving as a member of the President's cabinet and overseeing an Execu-
tive Branch department. 39 Although the Office of Legal Counsel has
been described as the "constitutional conscience" of the Department of
Justice, 40 it was that very office that repeatedly approved systemic acts of
torture in contradiction to clear legal mandates.4 1 While Alberto Gonza-
33 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93 (establishing the office of Attor-
ney General and granting the Attorney General prosecution power); see also Act of June 22,
1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162, 162 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 311 (1926)) ("[T]here shall be, and is
hereby, established an executive department of the United States, to be called the Department
of Justice, of which the Attorney General shall be the head."); 28 U.S.C. § 503 (2006) ("The
Attorney General is the head of the Department of Justice.").
34 OLC lawyers are said to "represent the long-term institutional interests of the execu-
tive branch, and are supposed to exercise judgment independent of the political will of the
[P]resident." TORTURE MEMOS, supra note 18, at 11 (citation omitted). The office has histori-
cally attracted some of America's most distinguished legal minds, such as Antonin Scalia,
Walter Dellinger, and Harold Koh. See id.
35 See id. at 13-19.
36 See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (holding that the
President can only remove quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial officers with the consent of
Congress); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 122 (1926) (holding that the President has the
exclusive power to remove Executive Branch officials and does not need the approval of the
Senate or any other legislative body). The Bush Administration exercised a historically high
level of control over U.S. Attorneys and fired nine U.S. Attorneys in the middle of George W.
Bush's second term for what many concluded were partisan reasons. See generally David C.
Weiss, Note, Nothing Improper? Examining Constitutional Limits, Congressional Action, Par-
tisan Motivation, and Pretextual Justification in the United States Attorney Removal, 107
MICH. L. REv. 317 (2008) (arguing that Congress should consider legislation limiting the abil-
ity of the President to remove U.S. Attorneys).
37 Press Release, Sen. Herbert Kohl, Nomination of John Ashcroft to be Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States (Jan. 30, 2001) (on file with author) ("Not only must the President
trust his Attorney General, the nation must also trust him, for, after all, the Attorney General is
America's lawyer.").
38 See, e.g., Diana N. Viggiano, Note, Aiming the Canons at the General: How Should
Traditional Canons of Legal Ethics Guide and Constrain an Attorney General?, 22 GEo. J.
LEGAL ETmcs 1193, 1198-99 (2009).
39 See 5 U.S.C. § 311 (1926); 28 U.S.C. § 503 (2006).
40 David Cole, The Torture Memos: The Case Against the Lawyers, N.Y. REV. BOOKS,
Oct. 8, 2009, at 15, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/oct/08/the-
torture-memos-the-case-against-the-lawyers/.
41 See TORTURE MEMOS, supra note 18, at 3-4. Harold Hongju Koh, former Dean of
Yale Law School and former Assistant Attorney General in the Office of Legal Counsel, in
testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated, "[I1n my professional opinion ... the
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les was described as "America's top cop" during the two and a half years
he served as Attorney General in the Bush Administration,42 he was also
personally connected to most of the crimes allegedly committed by Bush
Administration officials. 43 As the Slate interactive chart notes in the in-
troduction to its diagram of Bush Administration misconduct, "[I]f all
else fails, fall back on the golden rule of wrongdoing in the [Bush] White
House: All roads lead to Gonzales."44
Anyone capable of grasping the intuitive dysfunction of the fox
guarding the henhouse, or familiar with the fate of Thomas More after he
dared to defy Henry ViII's wishes, can understand the problem of grant-
ing prosecutorial power to a U.S. official under the President's control.45
The flawed U.S. system allows the most powerful officeholder in the
land to choose, supervise, and terminate at will the sole law enforcement
officer who has authority to initiate criminal proceedings against the Ex-
ecutive and his other appointees. 46
B. The Sanguine View of Prosecutorial Conflict of Interest Assessed
in the Context of Torture
This glaring conflict of prosecutorial interest appears too obvious to
deny, but some prominent constitutional scholars have defended the sta-
tus quo by reassuring us that the nation's systems of checks and balances
will remedy the problem. These scholars often take as their starting
point the 1988 Supreme Court case of Morrison v. Olson.4 7 In Morrison,
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Independent Coun-
sel Act,48 which established an independent prosecutor to investigate
misconduct by the President and other federal officials. 49 The majority
opinion was not without its critics, however-the most prominent being
[August 1, 2002 OLC] Memorandum is perhaps the most clearly legally erroneous opinion I
have ever heard." Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Alberto R. Gonzales to Be
Attorney General of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 158 (2005), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/109hrg/99932.
pdf.
42 See James Oliphant, Top Cop Must Serve Many Masters: Job Demands Legal, Politi-
cal, People Skills, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 28, 2007, at 10.
43 See Bazelon et al., supra note 1.
44 Id.
45 See PETER ACKROYD, THE LIFE OF THOMAS MORE 313-29, 406 (1998) (discussing
how Thomas More's opposition to Henry VIII's creation of the Church of England and his
interpretation of heresy laws lead to his execution).
46 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93 (granting the Attorney General
prosecution power); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926) (holding that the Presi-
dent has the power to appoint and remove executive officers).
47 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
48 The initial name of the Act was the Ethics in Government Act. See Pub. L. No. 95-
521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99) (repealed 1999). For further
discussion of the history and content of the Independent Counsel Act, see infra Part IV.B.
49 See Ethics in Government Act § 6.
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Justice Scalia, who penned the Olson dissent.50 Justice Scalia insisted
that two checks on Executive Branch powers would inevitably curb any
abuses from an Executive who avoids prosecution by her hand-picked
Attorney General:
The checks against any branch's abuse of its exclusive
powers are twofold: First, retaliation by one of the other
branch's use of its exclusive powers: Congress, for ex-
ample, can impeach the executive who willfully fails to
enforce the laws.. . . Second, and ultimately, there is the
political check that the people will replace those in the
political branches (the branches more "dangerous to the
political rights of the Constitution," Federalist No. 78, p.
465) who are guilty of abuse. Political pressures pro-
duced special prosecutors-for Teapot Dome and for
Watergate, for example . . .5
Professor Stephen Carter echoed Justice Scalia's view that there
was no need for an independent prosecutor with jurisdiction over Execu-
tive Branch officials. 52 Carter instead places his trust in mass media to
cast light on "every ethically questionable molehill" and doubts the ex-
tent to which presidents will attempt to control a given prosecutor given
the presence of media exposure.53 He also relies on the Legislative
Branch to curb Executive misconduct even if criminal charges are never
pursued:
So what if the executive branch won't prosecute? The
Congress has quite an impressive portfolio of powers of
its own, and need not wait for criminal conduct-or rest
its judgment on criminal standards-before meting out
its own effective means of punishment and control. The
Congress, for example, may use committee investiga-
tions, backed by subpoena power, to bring to light any
malfeasance in the executive branch; it may slash the
budget of agencies not doing their jobs; it may decline to
confirm presidential nominees for literally hundreds of
positions; and, ultimately, it may impeach executive of-
ficials and remove them from office. 54
50 See Morrison, 487 U.S. 697-734 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 711 (internal citation omitted).
52 See Stephen Carter, Comment, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV.
105, 113-15 (1988).
53 See id. at 136.
54 Id. at 136-37 (footnote omitted).
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In the 1990s, one-time supporters of the Independent Counsel Act
turned into critics after Kenneth Starr's wide-ranging investigation of
President Bill Clinton and argued that the availability of a special coun-
sel who is appointed and controlled by the Attorney General would pro-
tect against executive overreach.55 Professors Stephen Calabresi and
Nicholas Terrell later offered their own vote of confidence for Congress'
ability to control executive misconduct via the power of the purse, over-
sight hearings, and the ability to block confirmations: "The bottom line is
that the congressional committees have more sway over the Executive
Branch and the bureaucracy than the [p]resident [does]." 56
C. The Realities of Unchecked Executive Power
Recent events have not supported this laissez-faire confidence in the
existing system of indirect Executive Branch oversight. When the Bush
Administration sanctioned torture, Congress did in fact attempt to control
Executive Branch malfeasance by the same types of hearings5 7 and me-
dia advocacy,58 which Carter, Calabresi, and Terrell claimed would be
effective. 59 Led by the public advocacy of Senator John McCain, a sur-
55 See, e.g., James K. Robinson, Luncheon Address, After the Independent Counsel Act:
Where Do We Go from Here?, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 733, 734 (2000). Ironically, Kenneth Starr
expressed his own view that the Independent Counsel should be abolished, not because of the
problems in his own investigations or the effectiveness of other checks on power, but because
the existence of the Independent Counsel Act provided a false sense of security and indepen-
dent scrutiny. See Future of Independent Counsel Act: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. On
Governmental Affairs, 106th Cong. 425 (1999) (Statement of Kenneth Starr, Independent
Counsel) ("By its very existence, the Act promises us that corruption in high places will be
reliably monitored, investigated, exposed, and prosecuted, through a process fully insulated
from political winds. But that is more than the Act delivers, and more than it can deliver under
our constitutional system.").
56 Stephen Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Fatally Flawed Theory of the Unbundled
Executive, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1696, 1701 (2009).
57 See, e.g, Department of Justice: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th
Cong. 118-21 (2008) (letter from Rep. Conyers to Michael B. Mukasey, Att'y Gen. of the
U.S. (Jan. 31. 2008)) (discussing the issues about which Mukasey would testify, including
torture allegations), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/printers/110th/40741.pdf;
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Alberto R. Gonzales to Be Attorney General of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 14 (2005) (state-
ment of Alberto Gonzales, Att'y Gen. nominee, on torture policies), available at http://
www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/ I 09hrg/99932.pdf [hereinafter Gonzales Senate
Confirmation Hearing];,DOJ Oversight: Terrorism and Other Topics: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 13-16 (2004) (statement of John Ashcroft, Att'y Gen. of
the U.S., regarding allegations of torture), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate/pdf/108hrg/98625.pdf.
58 See, e.g., Press Release, Reps. Jerrod Nadler & Jane Hannan, Nadler, Harman Bills to
Restore Habeas Corpus, Ban Torture & Uphold Geneva Conventions (Mar. 7, 2007), available
at http://www.house.gov/list/press/ny08 nadler/HabeasGenevaCorrect03O807.html; Press Re-
lease, Senator Patrick Leahy, Statement Of Senator Patrick Leahy On The Abuse Of Prisoners
in U.S. Military Custody Released to Media (May 4, 2004) (on file with author).
59 See Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 56, at 1701.
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vivor of torture during his years of captivity during the Vietnam War,
Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,60 which expressly
prohibited cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment of any person in U.S.
custody.6' Yet Congress did not appoint a special counsel, and the Exec-
utive Branch remained free from accountability for criminal violations of
the many pre-existing laws governing prisoner treatment. 62 Furthermore,
the Department of Justice diluted the impact of this new legislation by
redefining the Administration's existing torture activities to seemingly
conform with the terms of the new law. 6 3
The Judicial Branch attempted to intervene in Executive Branch tor-
ture practices as well. In the 2006 case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,64 the
Supreme Court rejected President Bush's stated detainee policy by hold-
ing that the Geneva Conventions' prohibition of mistreatment of war de-
tainees applied to al-Qaeda suspects. 65 Consistent with existing Court
precedent, Hamdan held that intentional infliction of pain for interroga-
tion purposes "shocks the conscience"-the standard that the Senate
60 Pub. L. No. 109-48, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.).
61 Specifically, the Act provides that "[n]o person in the custody or under the effective
control of the Department of Defense or under detention in a Department of Defense facility
shall be subject to any treatment or technique of interrogation not authorized by and listed in
the United States Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation . . . ." Id. § 1002(a). This
prohibition applies regardless where the interrogation is conducted: "No individual in the cus-
tody or under the physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality
or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punish-
ment." Id. § 1003(a). The Act's definition of "Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Punishment or
Treatment" contains the same constitutional linkages as did the Senate's Ratification of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 27; furthermore, the Act took
its definition of what constituted cruelty from another set of U.N. understandings: the United
States Reservations, Declarations and Understandings to the United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
done at New York, December 10, 1984. See Detainee Treatment Act § 1003(d); see also U.S.
Dep't of Army, Field Manual 2-22.3 (FM 34-52), HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR OPERA-
TIONs 5-20 (2006), available at http://www.army.millinstitution/armypublicaffairs/pdf/fm2-22-
3.pdf. The Manual sets forth the military's approach to intelligence interrogations and flatly
prohibiting the use of force, including all acts of "physical or mental torture or any other form
of coercion." Id. Interrogated subjects "may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to un-
pleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind." Id.
62 Jordan J. Paust, Prosecuting the President and His Entourage, ILSA J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 539, 546-47 (2008) [hereinafter Paust, Prosecuting the President] (noting that over a five-
year period "the Bush Administration has furthered a general policy of impunity by refusing to
prosecute any person of any nationality under the War Crimes Act or alternative legislation,
the torture statute, genocide legislation, and legislation permitting prosecution of certain civil-
ians employed by or accompanying U.S. military forces abroad").
63 See Bradbury Memorandum, in TORTURE MEMos, supra note 18, at 241-74.
64 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
65 See id. at 629-30 ("[T]he Government asserts[ ] that Common Article 3 does not ap-
ply to Hamdan because the conflict with al Qaeda, being 'international in scope,' does not
qualify as a 'conflict not of an international character.' That reasoning is erroneous.") (citation
omitted) (additional quotation marks omitted)); ARMED SERvs., DETAINEE TREATMENT, Supra
note 16, at xii-xiii.
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adopted when ratifying the Convention Against Torture66-and thus vio-
lates the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.67 Again, Depart-
ment of Justice lawyers responded by simply changing definitions rather
than the underlying objectionable activities, as they produced new mem-
oranda that argued that existing CIA activities complied on paper with
the judicial rulings. 68 Perhaps the most notorious example is the August
1, 2002 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General to
White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, which claimed that the "severe
physical or mental pain or suffering" criminalized under the U.S. statute
implementing the Convention Against Torture69 must rise to a level asso-
ciated with "death, organ failure or serious impairment of body func-
tions" in order to constitute torture.70 Several years later Harold Hongju
Koh, then-Dean of Yale Law School, told Congress that Bybee's opinion
was "perhaps the most clearly erroneous legal opinion [he had] ever
read."7 1
The Legislative and Judicial Branches having failed to control Ex-
ecutive Branch torture activities, the only remaining hope was Justice
Scalia's "political check" on executive powers. 72 But if Legislative and
Judicial Branch attempts to curb the Executive Branch torture crimes re-
sulted in complete strike-outs, the political check was a sharp line-drive
finding its way into the opponent's waiting glove-a more promising
prospect that nevertheless resulted in nothing more than the final out.
D. A New President; Continued Impunity for Torture
The results of the 2008 presidential election brought hope for a
change in torture polices. President-elect Barack Obama was not only
from a different political party than his predecessor, but he also ex-
pressed sharply critical views of the Bush Administration's activities re-
66 See Convention Against Torture, supra note 26, art. 1.
67 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775 (2003) (opinion of Thomas, J.) (noting that
Due Process prohibits conduct that "shocks the conscience"). The justices disagreed about the
specific conclusions to be drawn from the facts in the case, but all who addressed the issue of
deliberate infliction of pain in order to compel an individual to talk agreed that this practice
would shock the conscience and violate the Constitution. See id.
68 See Bradbury Memorandum, in TORTURE MEMOS, supra note 18, at 263-72 ("For the
reasons stated, we conclude that CIA interrogation techniques, with their careful screening
procedures and medical monitoring, do not 'shock the conscience.').
69 Sen. Exec. Rep. 101-30, Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification (1990),
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2004).
70 See Bybee Memorandum, in TORTURE MEMOS, supra note 18, at 43.
71 Gonzales Senate Confirmation Hearing, supra note 57, at 158 (noting that the appar-
ent purpose of the opinion "is to explore how U.S. officials can use tactics tantamount to
torture against suspected terrorists, without being held criminally liable . . . . Under this ab-
surdly narrow legal definition, many of the heinous acts committed by the Iraqi security ser-
vices under Saddam Hussein would not be torture").
72 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 711 (1988).
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garding torture.73 President Obama appointed an Attorney General, Eric
Holder, who shared these views,74 thereby removing the self-preserva-
tion75 and conflict-of-interest 76 barriers that so predictably discouraged
the Bush Administration from pursuing torture investigations and
prosecutions.
However, since the election, Attorney General Holder's investiga-
tive policies have been insufficient, both as a practical matter and under
U.S. treaty obligations. In August of 2009, Holder announced that he
had asked a federal prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation of
the CIA's interrogation practices.77 But he also pledged that the Depart-
ment of Justice would not prosecute anyone who "acted in good faith and
within the scope of the legal guidance given by the Office of Legal
Counsel regarding the interrogation of detainees."78 Thus, as of late
2010, Holder has pursued neither investigations nor prosecutions of high-
ranking Executive Branch officials from the previous Administration.79
Despite the mandates of the Convention Against Torture, under which
the United States explicitly agreed to submit allegations of torture to au-
thorities for criminal prosecution,80 it appears that none of the Executive
73 See, e.g., Josh Rovenger, Analysis: Obama vs. McCain on Torture, CITIZENS FOR
GLOBAL CHANGE, May 28, 2008, http://www.globalsolutions.org/in-thenews/analy-
sis obama vs mccain torture (quoting President Obama as saying, "What we cannot do is
have the President of the United States state, as a matter of policy, that there is a loophole or
an exception where we would sanction torture"); Transcript: President Obama's 100th-Day
Press Briefing, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/29/us/politics/
29text-obama.html?pagewanted=4 (quoting President Obama as saying, "I believe that
waterboarding was torture. And I think that ... whatever legal rationales were used, it was a
mistake").
74 See Scott Shane, Remarks on Torture May Force New Administration's Hand, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at A12 (quoting Attorney General Holder at his congressional confirma-
tion hearing as saying, "We prosecuted our own soldiers for using it in Vietnam . . . .
Waterboarding is torture.").
75 See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
76 See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
77 See Carrie Johnson, Prosecutor to Probe CIA Investigations, WASH. PosT, Aug. 25,
2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/24/AR20090824017
43.html.
78 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Eric Holder Regarding a
Preliminary Review into the Interrogation of Certain Detainees (Aug. 24, 2009) [hereinafter
Holder Press Release], available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-
090824 I.html ("[T]he Department of Justice will not prosecute anyone who acted in good faith
and within the scope of the legal guidance given by the Office of Legal Counsel regarding the
interrogation of detainees. I want to reiterate that point today, and to underscore the fact that
this preliminary review will not focus on those individuals. I share the President's conviction
that as a nation, we must, to the extent possible, look forward and not backward when it comes
to issues such as these.").
79 See Jonathan Turley, Op-Ed., Appoint a Prosecutor for War Crimes, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
18, 2009, at A31.
80 See Convention Against Torture, supra note 26, at art. VII.
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Branch officials who sanctioned torture will be subject to criminal prose-
cution in the United States.81
Why have President Obama and his Attorney General not pursued
criminal prosecution of these Executive Branch torture crimes? When
asked about conducting investigations and filing indictments, the Presi-
dent did not dismiss the possibility outright, but said, "Generally speak-
ing, I'm more interested in looking forward than looking backwards." 8 2
There is a clear political element to this desire to "move on," which the
President himself articulated when campaigning for election: "I would
not want my first term consumed by what was perceived on the part of
the Republicans as a partisan witch hunt, because I think we've got too
many problems to solve." 83 The fear of political distraction caused by
torture prosecutions may indeed be valid, and the President's wide array
of responsibilities suggests that the electorate is less likely to punish him
for dereliction of a particular law enforcement duty.8 4
Although Obama's statements unsurprisingly appear to echo in At-
torney General Holder's subsequent prosecutorial decisions,85 it is also
important to note that U.S. prosecutions of Executive Branch officials for
sanctioning torture would not be easy. In general, it is notoriously diffi-
cult to convict "law enforcement" defendants of criminal charges, not to
mention high-profile leaders of the nation's government. 86 Specifically,
officials facing torture charges can use the U.S. criminal law defense of
"reasonable reliance" by showing that government officials advised them
that their conduct was lawful.87 Congress added another prosecutorial
barrier when it enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2006 and
pledged immunity to post-9/11 interrogators.88 Further, the Department
of Justice Office of Legal Counsel memoranda were clearly requested
and designed to provide legal cover to U.S. officials who approved and
81 See discussion infra Part IV.C.4. (prosecutions of high-ranking executive branch offi-
cials are being contemplated in other jurisdictions outside the United States).
82 Leahy Calls for "Truth Commission" on Torture, CNN.coM, Mar. 4, 2009, http://
www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/03/04/leahy.comniission/index.html.
83 Mark Benjamin, Would Obama Prosecute the Bush Administration for Torture?, SA-
LON (Aug. 4, 2008, 08:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2008/08/04/obamal.
84 See infra notes 144-46 (noting that President Bush won re-election in 2004 despite the
public's belief that the United States was engaging in illegal torture and its opposition to the
practice).
85 See Holder Press Release, supra note 78.
86 See Steven Puro, Federal Responsibility for Police Accountability Through Criminal
Prosecution, 22 ST. Louis U. Pus. L. REV. 95, 103-04 (2003) (noting that between 1984 and
1995, the Criminal Section of the U.S. Department of Justice had a seventy one percent suc-
cess rate in prosecuting law enforcement officers charged with civil rights violations, in con-
trast to its ninety five percent success rate for prosecuting non-law enforcement individuals).
87 See Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438-39 (1959).
88 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 8(b)(1)-(3), 120 Stat.
2600, 2636 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C.).
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participated in torture.89 As former Office of Legal Counsel attorney
Jack Goldsmith notes, the Justice Department considered OLC opinions
as "advance pardons" or "get-out-of-jail-free" cards dispensed to govern-
ment officials who relied on the opinions.90
However, the immunity-conferring power of an Office of Legal
Counsel opinion has recently been called into serious question from a
legal standpoint.91 In fact, if charges are filed against Bush Administra-
tion officials, the circumstances surrounding the composition of the tor-
ture memoranda will surely limit their prophylactic effect: through them,
the Office of Legal Counsel attempted to redefine torture in the face of
settled law9 2 and only made this attempt after oral discussions with Bush
Administration regarding the types of techniques the Administration
wished to employ on detainees. 93 As the Nuremberg Military Tribunals
show, the defense of reliance on internal directives attempt to pain con-
troversial activities as legal can be rejected. 94 The efficacy of the con-
gressionally-promised immunity from the Military Commissions Act is
similarly dubious.95
Potential criminal prosecution could be based on several grounds
brought independently or jointly: direct violation of the Convention
Against Torture (described above), aiding and abetting of an interna-
tional crime, participation in a joint criminal enterprise, or dereliction of
duty by civilian and military leaders.96 Federal prosecution could pro-
ceed pursuant to the War Crimes Act 9 7 or the federal torture statute 98 or
89 See TORTURE MEMOS, supra note 18, at 14.
90 JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 96-97 (2007).
91 See Note, The Immunity-Conferring Power of the Office of Legal Counsel, 121 HARV.
L. REv. 2086, 2091-92 (2008).
92 See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
93 See Mark Mazzetti, Bush Aides Tied to Talks on CIA Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 2008, at A14, available at http://www.iht.comi/articIes/2008/09/25/americalcia.php
(stating that Office of Legal Counsel attorney and torture memo author, John Yoo, gave oral
advice regarding interrogation methods before formal memoranda were produced).
94 See In re Von Leeb (German High Command Trial), 15 INT'L L. REPS. 376, 395-96
(1948) ("A directive to violate International Criminal Common Law is ... void and can afford
no protection to one who violates such law in reliance on such a directive."); see also Michael
P. Scharf, Seizing the "Grotian Moment": Accelerated Formation of Customary International
Law in Times of Fundamental Change, 43 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 439, 465-67 (2010) (noting that
although the International Law Commission originally distinguished between offenses made
pursuant to superior orders, it eventually abandoned that distinction).
95 See Paust, Absolute Prohibition, supra note 30, at 1548 & n.58 ("Congress has no
power to violate the separation of powers by such a blatant denial of a constitutionally man-
dated, traditional, and essential judicial power to implement treaty law of the United States
that, as the Constitution expressly requires, 'shall extend to all cases . . . arising under ...
treaties.[']") (citation omitted).
96 See Paust, Prosecuting the President, supra note 62, at 542-43.
97 See 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2003).
98 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2000).
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both. Indeed, potential legal barriers have not prevented the Obama Ad-
ministration from reviewing possible criminal prosecution against low-
level torture actors.99 That Attorney General Holder has not instigated
similar inquiries into the roles of high-level Executive Branch officials
seemingly has more to do with President Obama's acknowledged politi-
cal calculus than the actual challenges of criminal law.
Ultimately, the critical question is not whether torture prosecutions
would be successful or even politically damaging but, rather, whether the
United States will live up to its obligations to pursue such crimes as
those obligations are set out under international agreements and the rule
of law handed down over generations of American jurisprudence. It
seems clear that the Obama-appointed Attorney General has no more in-
tention to fulfill these obligations than the Bush-appointed Attorneys
General did. Thus, when confronted with multiple and egregious viola-
tions of the laws against torture, the "political check" on Executive
Branch misconduct has been no more effective than the Legislative and
Judicial attempts to sanction torture. Sadly, while Bush Administration
attorneys may have misstated the law on torture, they correctly assessed
the minimal risk of judicial review of Executive Branch actions. In one
memorandum, Department of Justice attorneys admitted that their per-
missive interpretation of the law on torture might not be upheld by a
reviewing court, but they gave our country's leaders the chillingly accu-
rate assurance that there was little to worry about since "the courts have
nothing to do and can give no redress."100 The memorandum concluded
that although "we cannot predict with confidence whether a court would
agree with [our] conclusion [that enhanced interrogation techniques are
legal], . . . the question is unlikely to be subject to judicial inquiry." 10'
When a new President takes office, the fox may no longer be guard-
ing the henhouse, but as the torture memo fiasco shows, he can still slink
away in impunity with feathers and chicken bones trailing in his wake.
The country's founders who were dedicated to curbing unchecked pow-
ers certainly would not approve of this state of affairs. As it turns out,
the history of the creation of the office of Attorney General, and the
establishment of our system of federal prosecution, shows that the foun-
99 See Holder Press Release, supra note 78.
100 Bradbury Memorandum, in TORTURE MEMOS, supra note 18, at 272 (citation omitted).
In his analysis of these concluding remarks in the memorandum, David Cole writes:
In other words, when it comes to the ban on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,
the CIA operates for all practical purposes in a "law-free zone," or at least in a zone
where the law is what the executive says it is-in secret-and no court will ever
have the opportunity to disagree.
Id. at 34.
lot Id. at 274. This final memo of May 2005, was the bookend to the first memo of
August 2002, which argued that neither the Legislative or Judicial Branch have any authority
to question the President's actions with regard to detainees. See id. at 85-90.
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ders never intended for the President to exercise the exclusive control
over federal criminal prosecution that has led our current state of Execu-
tive impunity.
II. THE MISSING LEGAL AND HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR
PRESIDENT-CONTROLLED FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS
A. The English and Colonial Traditions
English tradition informed the founders in many aspects of govern-
ment design including the creation of a chief legal officer. Beginning in
the Middle Ages, the Attorney General in England was at once the chief
legal advisor to the Crown, a consultant to both houses of Parliament,
and the chief administrator of the attorneys who acted on his behalf in
representing government agencies in court. 102 Although individuals
could bring criminal charges, the Attorney General retained the ability to
defeat a prosecution by filing a writ of nolle prosequi.03 Under the
reign of Henry VIII, the Attorney General began serving at the pleasure
of the crown, rather than under life tenure. 104 At the time of the United
States' founding, all thirteen colonies followed this model, with some
variations: Rhode Island popularly elected its attorney general, North
Carolina legislatively granted lifetime appointments, and New York and
Delaware the governors appointed their attorneys general. 0 5 The indi-
vidual colonies and new states imported English common law and, with
it, the dual nature of the office of attorney general as the chief legal
officer for both the citizens and the executive.106
B. The Constitutional Convention and the First Congress
The constitutional framers' creation of a unitary executive was a
deliberate and bold act.107 The executive councils of government under
the Articles of Confederation had been remarkably diffuse and just as
102 See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys Gen-
eral, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2449 (2006).
103 See S.F. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAw 404-05 (2d ed.
1981) (providing historical background regarding prosecutorial intervention); Rebecca Krauss,
The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and Development, 6 SETON
HALL CIRCUIT REV. 1, 16 (2009) (describing the concept of nolle prosequi).
104 See Marshall, supra note 102, at 2449.
105 See id. at 2450-51.
106 See JAY L. HIMES, STATE Parens Patriae Authority: The Evolution of the State Attor-
ney General's Authority 21 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-commit-
tees/at-state/pdf/publications/other-pubs/parens.pdf.
107 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; see also CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MIRACLE AT
PHILADELPHIA 55 (1966) (describing a hush falling over the convention when a single execu-
tive was first proposed). The term "unitary executive" here refers to a structure with a single
executive officer, not to be confused with the argument for a presidential prerogative to act
contrary to legislation. See infra note 137.
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remarkably ineffective,108 which inspired James Madison to argue in
Federalist No. 51 that a divided executive would be too weak to compete
effectively with the Legislative and Judicial Branches and not jeopardize
the necessary checks and balances." Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist
No. 70, insisted that a unitary executive fosters energy and efficiency,
and criticized a plural executive as "tend[ing] to conceal faults, and de-
stroy responsibility."' 10
This pre-convention lobbying, and the clear (if sparse) language of
Article II, Section 1 ("The executive power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America.")' notwithstanding, the framers would
not have opposed a system of federal criminal prosecution independent
of the executive. They were well aware of the independent prosecution
model used by England and several of the original states.112 However,
they neither took action to define the office of Attorney General in the
text of the Constitution nor appear to have conducted any debate on the
appointment, removal, or duties of the country's chief legal officer.113
Instead, it was left to the First Congress to establish the office. 114
Congress, too, did not seem to feel strongly about the need for a
dependent relationship between the Attorney General and the Presi-
dent,115 and, likely, did not even consider the general issue of presiden-
tial control over federal prosecutions. In initial drafts of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, the Supreme Court appointed the Attorney General.11 6 The
limited records available suggest that it was only conflict-of-interest con-
cerns raised by the Judiciary, not a desire for presidential control, that led
to Congress creating the Attorney General's office with a presidential
relationship in the final sentences of the Judiciary Act:
10 See Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Feb. 24, 1787), in 9 THE PA-
PERS OF JAMES MADISON 294-95 (Robert A. Rutland & William M.E. Rachal eds., 1975)
("Indeed the present System neither has nor deserves advocates; and if some very strong props
are not applied will quickly tumble to the ground.").
109 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321-22 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
("[T]he great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same depart-
ment, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional
means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense
must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition
must be made to counteract ambition.").
110 Id. at No. 70, at 427 (Alexander Hamilton) ("But one of the weightiest objections to a
plurality in the Executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first plan, is, that it
tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility.").
111 U.S. CONsT. art H, § 1, cl. 1.
112 See Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional
Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DuKE L.J. 561, 564 n.l 1, 603-04
(1989).
113 See id. at 570.
114 See id. at 570-71.
115 See id. at 571.
116 See id. at 589.
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And there shall .. . be appointed a meet person, learned
in the law, to act as attorney-general for the United
States, who shall be sworn or affirmed to a faithful exe-
cution of his office; whose duty it shall be to prosecute
and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which the
United States shall be concerned, and to give his advice
and opinion upon questions of law when required by the
President of the United States, or when requested by the
heads of any departments, touching any matters that may
concern their departments, and shall receive such com-
pensation for his services as shall by law be provided.' 17
Congress was silent on the question of to whom the Attorney Gen-
eral should report within the new government. As Susan Low Bloch has
pointed out, this lack of specificity was in marked contrast to the Consti-
tution's and Congress' very explicit efforts to invest significant presiden-
tial authority over other government officials:
Although the framers decided that the Constitution
should vest the executive power in a single President-
not a "plural executive"-none of the early interpreters
seemed to believe that that constitutional decision dic-
tated that the President have the same degree of control
over all executive officers. To be an effective head of
state, the President needed maximum control over the
Secretaries of War and Foreign Affairs and, accordingly,
was given the power to appoint and remove these of-
ficers and to direct their activities. However, with the
Attorney General, where centralized control was appar-
ently not deemed essential, the President was explicitly
given only the power to appoint; the power to remove
and to direct were left unspecified. 1's
Other historians have reviewed this same record and concluded that
exclusive Executive Branch control over law enforcement has neither
constitutional nor historical foundation. 119
117 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, 93. Bloch also notes the absence of a signifi-
cant record of why the final version of the Act departed from judicial appointment of the
Attorney General but suggests it may have been inspired by judges' suggestions to members of
Congress. See Bloch, supra note 112, at 571 n.32.
118 Bloch, supra note 112, at 636-37.
119 See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some
Lessons from History, 38 Am. U. L. REv. 275, 281-310 (1989); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R.
Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 15-22 (1994).
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C. Post-Founding Evolution of the U.S. Attorney General
In 1792, one Supreme Court justice insisted that the Attorney Gen-
eral was empowered to respond to the interests of the government re-
gardless of explicit presidential approval, remarking: "[H]e is not called
the Attorney General of the President, but Attorney General of the
United States."120 Consequently, for many decades after its creation, the
U.S. Attorney General did not hold a particularly important or powerful
position, and the office did not appear exclusively attached to the Presi-
dent. 121 Instead, the Attorney General performed a part-time job with
neither staff nor office space and appeared to report to, and serve, Con-
gress as much as the President. 122 He had no supervisory authority over
district attorneys who operated as semi-autonomous assistants to judges
and grand juries.123
In the mid-nineteenth century, however, the power of both the At-
torney General and the entire Executive Branch began to grow, and this
would impact how the two interacted with each other. The Attorney
General started receiving a salary on par with other cabinet officials, then
gained control over district attorneys and marshals, and eventually over-
saw a fully staffed Department of Justice. 124 As the Office of the Attor-
ney General expanded its reach, so did the broader Executive Branch in
relation to the Judicial and Legislative Branches.125 The dramatic impact
of these changes have led some to conclude that both the Attorney Gen-
eral and the President he serves have become more similar to the Henry
VIII-Thomas More model than the framers would ever have imagined
possible. 126
120 Bloch, supra note 112, at 606 (citing Notes and Memoranda from James Iredell, Jus-
tice, U.S. Supreme Court (1792) (on file with the North Carolina State Department of
Archives, Charles E. Johnson Collection)).
121 Krent, supra note 119, at 286-89.
122 Bloch, supra note 112, at 581-82.
123 HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 17, 142-43 (1937).
124 Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, § 1, 16 Stat. 162 ("There shall be, and is hereby,
established an executive department of the government of the United States, to be called the
Department of Justice, of which the Attorney General shall be the head. His duties, salary, and
tenure of office shall remain as now fixed by law, except so far as they may be modified by
this act.").
125 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During
the First Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1451 (1997); Steven G. Calabresi & Christo-
pher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the Second Half-Century, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 667 (2003); Christopher S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive During the Third Half-
Century, 1889-1945, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1 (2004); Christopher S. Yoo et al., The Uni-
tary Executive In The Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REv. 601 (2004).
126 See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1727
(1996) ("The dominance of executive power ought by now, to lift a phrase from Charles
Black, to be a matter of common notoriety not so much for judicial notice as for background
knowledge of educated people who live in this republic."). William Marshall points out that
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III. MORE PROSECUTORIAL INDEPENDENCE WOULD LEAD TO
BETTER GOVERNANCE
Several commentators have argued that the establishment of a pros-
ecutor who operates independently of the Executive Branch would not
only avoid the aforementioned conflicts of interest but also lead to
greater transparency in decision-making 27 and accountability to vot-
ers. 128 An independent prosecutor would allow the electorate to have a
more direct impact on policy because prosecutorial decision-making
would not be wedded to the plethora of issues in the presidential election
that would otherwise cloud such thinking.129 These observations are
more than just theory; recent evidence supports the proposition that
prosecutorial independence from executive control will lead to both more
electorate confidence and better governance overall.130
A. Empirical Evidence That Executive Control over Prosecution
Increases Chances of Corruption
In 2008, Anne van Aaken, Lars Feld, and Stefan Voigt tested the
hypothesis that prosecution agencies that depend on the Executive have
less incentive to prosecute government actors, thus reducing these actors'
the unitary executive framework commands this result notwithstanding any pre-established
checks:
On paper at least, there is a watchdog guarding against executive branch excess
. . . . But under the unitary executive framework, it is the President's, and not the
Attorney General's, position on the duties and obligations of the Office that controls.
And by his power of appointment or otherwise, the President can assure that the
Attorney General's and Department of Justice's primary fealty is to his Administra-
tion and not to some abstract view of the law. Without any structural assurance of
independence, in short, the Office of the Attorney General is only as independent as
the President wants it to be.
Marshall, supra note 102, at 2470-71.
127 See Marshall, supra note 102, at 2475.
128 See Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The
Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 196-99 (1994) [hereinafter
Shane, Political Accountability].
129 See Viggiano, supra note 38, at 1208 ("It is also unlikely that displeasure with the
actions taken by the Attorney General would be the issue foremost in the mind of a voter on
Election Day when he or she must also be considering the nation's foreign policy, economy,
and overall domestic agenda. Impeachment is an equally unattractive alternative remedy,
since displeasure with one cabinet member's behavior does not seem to be a reasonable basis
upon which to impeach the President.").
130 It is worth noting that new democracies in Eastern Europe have been characterized by
their separation of the chief prosecutor from executive control. See Darina Skbyovd, Role and
Status of the Public Prosecution Service, in WHAT PUBLIC PROSECUTION IN EUROPE IN THE
21ST CENTURY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE PAN-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE 79 (2000); Alenka Selih,
The Prosecution Process and the (Changing) Role of the Prosecutor, in CRIME AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN EUROPE 93, 96-97 (2000) (advocating for appointments of a fixed period of time in
order to avoid prosecutors being dependent on other government officials, and noting that new
Eastern European governments are likely to have their chief prosecutors chosen by parliament
to avoid dominance of the position by the chief executive).
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risk of sanction for misconduct.13' In so doing, they evaluated whether
an independent prosecutorial agency reduced the likelihood of govern-
ment officials committing crimes.132 To test their hypothesis, they con-
structed two cross-national indicators of prosecutorial independence. 1 3 3
The first indicator measured seven variables of de facto prosecutorial
independence including executive power to remove prosecutors, budget
and salary adequacy and independence, and fluctuations in the legal
foundation for prosecuting official misconduct. 134 Collecting data from
seventy-eight countries and comparing the results to local perception of
corruption, they concluded that de facto prosecutorial independence was
highly and robustly significant in explaining variation in measures of
perceived corruption.' 35 These results support the intuitive assumption
that independent prosecutorial oversight decreases the occurrence of offi-
cial misconduct.136
B. Empirical Evidence That an Unbundled Executive Provides More
Effective Governance
As discussed in subpart B of Part II, the U.S. federal system features
a unitary executive with a wide and seemingly broadening array of pow-
ers vested in the President alone. Christopher Berry and Jacob Gersen
argue that public preferences would be better served by "unbundling" the
federal Executive, i.e., directly electing one or more federal officials such
131 See Anne van Aaken et al., Power over Prosecutors Corrupts Politicians: Cross
Country Evidence Using a New Indicator 1 (MAGKS Joint Discussion Series on Economics
No. 01-2008), available at http://www.uni-marburg.de/fbO2/makro/forschung/magkspapers/
01-2008_voigt.pdf.
132 See id. at 15 (noting that de facto independence reduces crimes, while de jure indepen-
dence does not).
133 See id. at 2.
134 See id. at 10-12.
135 See id.
136 Van Aaken et al. also conducted analyses of de jure prosecutorial independence show-
ing a negative relationship to de facto prosecutorial independence and a positive relationship to
perceived corruption, which they suggest reflects the pressure exerted on governments by in-
ternational development agencies to adopt anti-corruption measures. Id. at 16. Their analysis
showed that the de jure measure was significantly impacted by recently-passed legislation
promising procedural improvements that did not yet show up as having a de facto impact. For
example, Aaken et al.'s measures showed that the presence of an anti-corruption agency, pre-
sumably created in response to incidents of official misconduct, had an overall positive rela-
tionship to corruption measures. Id. at 18. Findings indicating that promises do not equal
performance are consistent with Oona Hathaway's quantitative analysis of countries' failures
to live up to their human rights treaties. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties
Make a Difference?, Ill YALE L.J. 1935, 1976-2000 (2002) (finding, in some cases, that
ratification of such treaties was associated with worse practices); see also Fran Quigley, Grow-
ing Political Will from the Grassroots: How Social Movement Principles Can Reverse the
Dismal Legacy of Rule of Law Interventions, 41.1 COLUM. Hum. Rrs. L. REV. 13 (2009)
(discussing the disparity between Kenya's formal human rights pledges and its administration
of justice).
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as the Attorney General.' 3 7 Peter Shane agrees and lays out the problem
of an electorate choosing a President who is invested with the responsi-
bility for an overstuffed portfolio of issues:
There is no evidence that the President, at any given mo-
ment, embodies that set of policy predilections across a
wide set of issues that is held by a contemporaneous ma-
jority-or, more accurately, by contemporaneous major-
ities of Americans . . . . There is one most obvious
reason why the President would mirror public opinion
polls quite imperfectly-the President is a single person.
Assuming it is even possible to identify, at a given mo-
ment, the full array of value judgments that various ma-
jorities of Americans hold across a comprehensive range
of important public policy issues, it is doubtful that the
resulting attitudinal profile would be sufficiently coher-
ent to impute it to any single personality.138
In contrast to van Aaken, Feld, and Voigt's cross-national evalua-
tion of political systems, Berry and Gersen focus on U.S. state and local
governments where the dominant model is an unbundled Executive.' 39
Analyzing these government models, Berry and Gersen show that adding
executive-level officials produces greater clarity in voter control over
policy issues and shifts policy outcomes toward voter preferences.1 40
Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate produced similar results in the con-
text of state utility regulators in the United States: those regulators who
adopted more consumer-friendly policies were elected, rather than ap-
pointed, to their positions.' 4 '
Increasing the number of elected executive officeholders, according
to Berry and Gersen, will ensure that government policy is more line
with citizen preferences-at least while the number of officeholders re-
mains small enough for the public to effectively monitor.142 Applying
the relevant data, the authors wrote:
137 Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1385, 1387 (2008) (hereinafter Berry & Gersen I).
138 Shane, Political Accountability, supra note 128, at 197-98.
139 See Berry & Gersen I, supra note 137, at 1386 (citing data that forty two states elect
their attorneys general).
140 See Christopher R. Berry and Jacob E. Gersen, Fiscal Consequences of Electoral In-
stitutions, 52 J.L. & EcON. 469, 491 [hereinafter Berry & Gersen II].
141 See Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, Elected Versus Appointed Regulators: Theory
and Evidence, 1 J. EUR. EcON. Ass'N 1176, 1200-01 (2003).
142 See Berry & Gersen I, supra note 140, at 470. Berry and Gersen's evaluations show a
U-shaped relationship between the number of elected officials in local government and pat-
terns of government taxing and spending. See id. This supports the theory that increasing the
number of elected officials increases accountability, providing a net positive effect until the
costs of monitoring the increasing number of officials outweighs that benefit. See id.
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An unbundled executive systematically reduces agency
problems in representative government by enhancing ac-
countability to natural citizen constituencies . . . . [A]
vote for or against a presidential candidate is remarkably
crude; it is a weighted average of voter approval of doz-
ens if not hundreds of policy dimensions. A vote for or
against an elected secretary of education is less so.14 3
The electorate's difficulty in fully expressing its policy preferences
through a single presidential vote gained further credence during the
2004 presidential election. At the start of his second term, President
Bush claimed the 2004 election and its results were his "accountability
moment."'" Yet, poll numbers indicate that his re-election was not a
statement of widespread approval for all of his Administration's actions.
Public opinion data in the summer of 2004 showed that Americans disap-
proved of torture by a 2-1 margin and that most Americans believed that
the Bush Administration was in fact conducting such torture.145 Yet
Bush was re-elected to office that same November by voters who cited
other priorities such as the war in Iraq, the economy, and health care.14 6
It seems clear that Bush's re-election was not a statement of wide-
spread approval for his Administration's torture actions. By extension, it
is quite possible that an independent Attorney General candidate who
pledged to vigorously investigate and prosecute torturers and their en-
ablers would have won election in the same contest. Such an outcome
would have reduced the slack between voter preferences and executive
action that Berry and Gersen identify1 47 and better preserved the defense
of the rule of law.
IV. OPTIONS FOR INDEPENDENT PROSECUTORIAL OVERSIGHT OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH
A. Direct Election of a Federal Attorney General
The obvious fox-guarding-the-henhouse flaw of placing
prosecutorial authority in the hands of the President of the United
States-who could also be the target of such prosecution-suggests an
143 Berry & Gersen I, supra note 137, at 1387, 1405.
144 Interview by Michael A. Fletcher & Jim VandeHei with George W. Bush, President,
United States of Am., aboard Air Force One (Jan. 14, 2005), reprinted as Transcript of Bush
Interview, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A12570-
2005Janl5.
145 David Morris & Gary Langer, Most Americans Oppose Torture Techniques,
ABCNEWS.COM, May 27, 2004, http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/Polls/torture-poll_040527.
html.
146 Poll: Voters Relieved by Decisive Election, USA TODAY.COM, Nov. 8, 2004, http://
www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/2004-11-08-voters-relievedx.htm.
147 See Berry & Gersen II, supra note 140, at 471.
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equally obvious solution: the direct election of a federal Attorney Gen-
eral. In his provocatively titled essay, Break Up the Presidency, Profes-
sor William Marshall argues that an elected Attorney General would be
clearly independent of the President and directly accountable to the elec-
torate. 148 The office would then mirror the dominant model for the se-
lection of state attorneys general and local-level prosecutors. 149
Although removing the Attorney General from the purview of the Presi-
dent would arguably require a constitutional amendment to Article 11,150
preserving the integrity of a government in which no officeholder is
above the law justifies such an extraordinary measure.' 5 '
Defenders of the "unitary executive" status quo-who should not be
confused with those who support a similarly-labeled theory of presiden-
tial prerogative to act contrary to legislationl 52-argue that a shift to-
wards electing more federal officials would tax the attention span of
voters, weaken the Executive Branch in relation to the Legislative, and
blur the boundaries of executive power in times of national crisis.' 53
148 See Marshall, supra note 102, at 2476.
149 See Eric Rasmusen et al., Convictions Versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor's
Choice, 11 Am. L. & ECON. REv. 47, 67-68 (2009) (citing the fact that chief prosecutors are
elected everywhere except for Alaska, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, and New Jersey).
The article notes that "[i]n Alaska, Delaware and Rhode Island, criminal prosecution is the
primary responsibility of the Attorney General (appointed in Alaska and elected in Delaware
and Rhode Island) and in the District of Columbia the U.S. Attorney has jurisdiction over
felonies and misdemeanors." Id.
150 See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489-90 (1999)
(citing United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463-65 (1996) (noting that prosecutorial
discretion is "special providence" of the Executive Branch)); Proposals Regarding an Indepen-
dent Attorney General, 1 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 75, 77-78 (1977) (concluding that
proposals to make the Attorney General independent would be a violation of the constitutional
charge that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed") (quoting U.S.
Const. art. II, § 3)). But see supra notes 113-18 for a discussion of evidence suggesting that
the framers did not specifically address the question of whether the Attorney General would be
appointed by the President and that the first Congress did not see presidential control of federal
prosecutions as a constitutional mandate.
t51 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). Berry and Gersen
acknowledge the difficulty of enacting constitutional changes but also note the trend towards
directly-elected executive offices at state and local levels and argue that there is ample reason
to be open to such a change at the federal level. See Berry & Gersen I, supra note 137, at
1428-29 ("The structure of the executive branch has changed enormously since the founding
.... As society changes, political institutions do as well. If old unbundled executives should
be eliminated and new unbundled executives create, so be it.").
152 Calabresi & Terrell, supra note 56, at 1697.
153 See id. at 1705, 1712, 1739. Berry and Gersen are the main foils for the Calabresi and
Terrell argument, but they return the favor with a humorous but pointed refutation of any
suggestion that an unbundled executive would lead to lesser candidates for the presidency:
The candidates most likely to run for president in the current regime who would not
do so in the unbundled regime are likely to be candidates for whom aggregate power
is the most important concern. These candidates prize being the person in control of
everything. Perhaps this group of candidates makes for especially good presidents,
but they seem to have most in common with megalomaniacs. In other countries, this
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However, these arguments are refuted by the empirical evidence of in-
creased public confidence in "divided" executives cited in Part Ell. Fur-
ther, an independent attorney general arrangement is the predominant
method at the state level1 54 and has never been reversed by a state that
adopted it. 5 These facts not only support one explicitly identifiable
reason for keeping the state attorneys general independent of the Gover-
nor-to check the power of the states' chief executives l 56-but also
serve as a harbinger of the state-level trend toward increasing the number
of directly elected executive officers.157 States most often invest
prosecutorial powers in local prosecuting attorneys,' 58 and almost all lo-
cal jurisdictions elect their local chief prosecutors.159 Since state and
local prosecutors handle a much heavier caseload than their federal coun-
terparts, ninety-five percent of felony criminal cases in the United States
are investigated, filed, and pursued by prosecutors accountable to direct
election.' 60 Thus, independent election of a chief legal officer is not an
unproven model, or even an imported one. Rather, it is the dominant
model of prosecution in the United States.
Aligning the federal Executive elections process with established
state procedures also resolves the inherent conflicts of interest arising
from presidential control over a would-be prosecutor.161 An elected
prosecutor who chose to ignore her local executive branch's transgres-
would be a group of likely dictators, not responsive and responsible officials. Mak-
ing the election of megalomaniacs or aspiring dictators less likely hardly seems a
mark of shame for any executive regime.
Berry & Gersen I, supra note 137, at 1420.
154 See 40 COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'Ts, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 232 tbl.4.19 (2008 ed.)
(identifying forty-five states in which the Attorney General is independent of the governor).
155 See Marshall, supra note 102, at 2452.
156 See id. at 2451-52 (quoting State ex rel. Mattson v. Kiedrowski, 391 N.W.2d 777, 782
(Minn. 1986)). In Mattson, the Minnesota Supreme Court outlined the state's rationale for
independent executive officers:
Rather than conferring all executive authority upon a governor, the drafters of our
constitution divided the executive powers of state government among six elected
officers. This was a conscious effort on the part of the drafters, who were well
aware of the colonial aversion to royal governors who possessed unified executive
powers.
Mattson, 391 N.W.2d at 782.
157 Berry & Gersen I, supra note 137, at 1400.
158 See Robert Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
oGY 717, 734 (1996); cf. BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 158, at 235 tbl.4.21 (listing the
prosecutorial and advisory duties of the Attorney General with respect to local prosecutions).
159 Only three states do not elect their local prosecutors: Alaska, Delaware, and Rhode
Island. Rasmusen et al., supra note 149, at 49, 68-69 (noting that, in 1994, U.S. state courts
convicted 870,000 people of felonies, and the federal courts convicted another 44,000). In the
three states that do not elect local prosecutors, the state Attorney General oversees criminal
prosecution. See id. Even so, in two of these states-Rhode Island and Delaware-the Attor-
ney General is still an elected official. See id.
160 Id.
161 See infra Part II.B.
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sions the way federal attorneys general have done with the Bush Admin-
istration would very likely face significant challenges in her next election
cycle.162 It is equally likely that the framers, whose goals were to check
the power of any one branch of government,163 ensure responsiveness to
the citizenry'" and allow for constitutional change when events merit,165
would not object to amending Article II to create a directly elected attor-
ney general and thus ensure a more responsive and accountable Execu-
tive Branch.
B. A Revived-and Revised-Independent Counsel
1. History of the Independent Counsel
Quite unintentionally, President Richard Nixon provided the inspi-
ration for the creation of an independent counsel to investigate and pros-
ecute Executive Branch crimes. First, in 1971, President Nixon allegedly
ordered Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst to drop the gov-
ernment's antitrust suit against International Telephone and Telegraph
Corp., which happened to be a major contributor to the 1972 Republican
Convention.166 Then, on October 20, 1973, Nixon carried out his infa-
mous "Saturday Night Massacre," ordering Attorney General Elliot
Richardson to fire Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox after the
District Court for the District of Columbia ordered Nixon to turn over
tape recordings that Cox had subpoenaed.167 Although both Richardson
and his deputy, William Ruckelhaus, refused to obey Nixon's order and
resigned, Solicitor General Robert Bork obeyed Nixon's order and fired
Cox.168
162 See Gregory Huber & Sanford Gordon, Citizen Oversight and the Electoral Incentives
of Criminal Prosecutors, 46 AM. J. POL. Sci. 334, 337 (2002) (noting that voters can observe
and evaluate their prosecutor's performance, and candidates for these positions may advertise
an incumbent's poor results).
163 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 109, at 321-22 (James Madison).
164 See id. at No. 52, at 327 (James Madison) ("As it is essential to liberty that the govern-
ment in general should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly essential
that the branch of it under consideration should have an immediate dependence on, and an
intimate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by
which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured.").
165 See U.S. CONsT. art. V ("The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of
the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by
Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be
proposed by the Congress . . . .").
166 The Nation: Re-Opening ITT, TIME, Nov. 12, 1973, available at http://www.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,944655,00.html.
167 CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN 333 (1974).
168 Id.
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President Nixon's brazen efforts to place himself above the law led
to dozens of congressional proposals for reforming the investigation and
prosecution of Executive Branch matters.169 Unsuccessful proposals in-
cluded turning the Department of Justice into an independent agency
headed by an attorney general appointed for a fixed six-year termo70 and
allowing the courts or Congress to directly appoint a special prosecutor
to investigate acts of Executive Branch wrongdoing. 71 Narrower but
successful efforts included allowing the Comptroller General, whom the
President appoints with the advice and consent of the Senate to a fifteen-
year term, 172 to obtain information from executive departments, investi-
gate fraud in those departments, and sue to challenge executive
impoundments. 7 3
Ultimately, Nixon's overreach led to the passage of the 1978 Ethics
in Government Act, which provided for the creation of an independent
counsel.' 7 4 The Act required the Attorney General, upon learning of al-
leged criminal activity, to investigate high-ranking executive officials in-
cluding the President, Vice President, cabinet-level officials, high-
ranking officials in the Executive Office of the President and the Depart-
ment of Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Internal Revenue
Service, and the President's national campaign.' 75 If the Attorney Gen-
eral found reasonable grounds for further investigation, she applied to the
Special Division, a three-judge panel chosen by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, for the appointment of a special prosecutor or "indepen-
dent counsel."1 76 After referral of the matter to the Special Division, the
Attorney General and the Department of Justice suspended their own in-
vestigations and proceedings and allowed the independent counsel to
proceed with "all investigative and prosecutorial functions."' 77 The At-
169 See Ken Gormley, An Original Model of the Independent Counsel Statute, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 601, 608 (1998).
170 Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearing on S. 2803 and S. 2978
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.
229, 233-47, 250 (1974) [hereinafter Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice].
171 Id.
172 31 U.S.C. § 703 (2006).
173 See, e.g., Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 10, 88 Stat. 297,
332 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 687 (Supp. V 1987)) (authorizing the Comptroller
General to sue to challenge executive impoundments); General Accounting Office Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-226, 94 Stat. 311 (1980) (authorizing the Comptroller General to sue to
obtain information from executive departments); Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (1978) (authorizing the Inspector General to investigate waste and fraud
in executive agencies), amended by Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffir-
mation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754, 786 (1987).
174 Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 6, 92 Stat. 1824, 1867-73
(1978) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99 (1994)) (repealed 1999).
175 See id. § 592.
176 See id. §§ 592-93.
177 Id. § 594.
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torney General retained the ability to remove the independent counsel for
incapacity or extraordinary impropriety, and either the independent coun-
sel or the Special Division could terminate the office.'17 The Ethics in
Government Act included a five-year sunset provision179 and was subse-
quently renewed three times, with some amendments, and renamed the
Independent Counsel Act.180
In 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Independent Counsel Act in Morrison v. Olson.181 Based on the conclu-
sion that the independent counsel was an "inferior," court-appointed of-
ficer, the Court first held that the Act did not violate the Appointments
Clause of the Constitution,18 2 which vests major appointment powers in
the President. 183 The Court then found that no separation of powers con-
cerns existed because the Attorney General and the President retained the
power to make the initial referral of the matter to the Special Division
and to remove the independent counsel for good cause.184
Despite the Supreme Court's imprimatur, delivered in a 7-1 major-
ity decision over Justice Scalia's dissent, the independent counsel re-
ceived widespread criticism from conservative legal scholars who found
the legislation to be both unnecessary and a violation of the separation of
powers.'85 In the 1990s, these scholars gained allies across the ideologi-
cal spectrum after former D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Kenneth
W. Starr's wide-ranging, five-year investigation of the Clinton Adminis-
tration.18 6 Starr's investigation strayed far from its original mandate by
moving from alleged improprieties in the Clintons' pre-presidential real
178 See id. § 596.
179 See id. § 599.
180 See Katy J. Harriger, The History of the Independent Counsel Provisions: How the
Past Informs the Current Debate, 49 MERCER L. REV. 489, 505-14 (1998).
181 487 U.S. 654, 659-69 (1988).
182 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; Morrison, 487 U.S. at 672.
183 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law:
but Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.").
184 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695 ("The Act does give the Attorney General several means of
supervising or controlling the prosecutorial powers that may be wielded by an independent
counsel. . . . Notwithstanding the fact that the counsel is to some degree "independent" and
free from executive supervision to a greater extent than other federal prosecutors, in our view
these features of the Act give the Executive Branch sufficient control over the independent
counsel to ensure that the President is able to perform his constitutionally assigned duties.").
185 See, e.g., Carter, supra note 52; Michael B. Rappaport, Replacing Independent Coun-
sels with Congressional Investigations, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1595, 1604 (2000).
186 See David Halperin, Ethics Breakthrough or Ethics Breakdown? Kenneth Starr's Dual
Roles as Private Practitioner and Public Prosecutor, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmics 231, 242-43
(2002) (calling the scope of Starr's investigation as approved by the Special Division "an
extraordinary expansion of his jurisdiction").
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estate dealings in Arkansas to investigations into the firings of White
House travel office staff, allegations of illegal foreign campaign contri-
butions, and finally to the President's extramarital affair with White
House intern, Monica Lewinsky.1 s7 The Starr investigation was widely
criticized as partisan in motivation,'*8 and when Starr and the Special
Division proved to be impervious to that criticism, critics focused on the
lack of accountability in the independent counsel scheme. 189 Popular
and congressional concerns over the Starr investigation doomed the Inde-
pendent Counsel Act, and Congress allowed it to sunset in 1999.190
2. The Special Counsel
With the Independent Counsel gone, the Department of Justice is-
sued new regulations to create a special counsel to investigate allegations
of wrongdoing in the Executive Branch.191 Although the stated goals of
the special counsel provision sounded similar to the independent counsel
legislation-it required separation from the ordinary prosecution review
if the investigation "would present a conflict of interest for the Depart-
ment [of Justice]" and "would be in the public interest"192-the removal
of the adjective "independent" from any designation of this position is
significant.193 This removal is more than semantic: in fact, the Attorney
General controls the special counsel from start to finish, as she retains
the power to determine (1) whether to appoint the Special Counsel, 194 (2)
who to select, 195 (3) what the Counsel's jurisdiction will be,196 and (4)
187 See id.
188 See, e.g., Editorial, Mr. Starr's Conflicts, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 31, 1996, http://
www.nytimes.com/1996/03/31/opinion/mr-starr-s-conflicts.html.
189 See Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Incentives and Bad Institutions, 86 GEO. L.J. 2267, 2274
(1998); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Learning the Wrong Lessons from History: Why There
Must Be an Independent Counsel Law, 5 WIDENER L. Symp. J. 1, 2 (2000) ("After the White-
water debacle, the idea of an independent counsel seems clearly doomed. Many Republicans
have always opposed the law because of its anti-Nixon origins and because of its use against
Republican presidents, such as in the Iran-Contra scandal. Now Democrats have equal reason
to hate the independent counsel statute because of how it was used against the Clinton
Administration.").
190 See id.; see also Halperin, supra note 186, at 235. Halperin explains that the decision
to allow the Independent Counsel Act to sunset reflected the "collective judgment" of Presi-
dent Clinton, his Administration, Congress, and a considerable number of "scholars, journal-
ists, and other observers." Halperin, supra note 186, at 235. Essentially, "the benefits gained
in avoiding abuses and conflicts of interest by means of the independent counsel law were
outweighed by negative consequences of the law: the potential for abuses of power by inde-
pendent counsels themselves, excessive expenditure of resources, and undue burdens on inno-
cent officials." Id.
191 See Office of Special Counsel Regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 600 (2009).
192 Id. § 600.1.
193 Id.
194 Id. § 600.2.
195 Id. § 600.3.
196 Id. § 600.4.
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whether to suspend the investigation at any time with only the proviso
that the Attorney General notify Congress of the suspension decision.197
In short, the independent counsel statute returns to the Attorney General
all of the roles formerly invested in the Special Division. 198
3. Envisioning a Revived and Redesigned Independent Counsel
Given the lack of an independent permanent prosecutor, the absence
of an independent counsel statute, and the toothlessness of the special
counsel structure, it is not surprising that the Bush Administration sanc-
tioned torture with the confidence that comes with self-provided impu-
nity.199 This disturbing turn of events suggests that Congress
overreacted to the abuse of the independent counsel statute in the 1990s,
in essence throwing the independent prosecutor baby out with the Starr
investigations bathwater. 200 The sprawl of the Starr investigation in the
face of public disapproval exposed a fundamental flaw of the Indepen-
dent Counsel Act: neither the independent counsel nor its appointing
body, the Special Division, was accountable to the electorate. 201 Schol-
ars proposed two structural changes after Watergate that could guide the
redesign. One proposal would make the Department of Justice an inde-
pendent agency, like the Federal Trade Commission, 202 with an attorney
19' Id. § 600.7(b).
198 See John Padilla & Alex Wagner, The "Outing" of Valerie Plame: Conflicts of Inter-
est in Political Investigations After the Independent Counsel Act's Demise, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 977, 987 (2004) (discussing parallels between the Independent Counsel Act and special
counsel provisions).
199 See Bradbury Memorandum, in TORTURE MEMOS, supra note 18, at 273 (showing the
Deputy Attorney General's assurance to the Executive Branch that judicial scrutiny of torture
decisions was extremely unlikely).
200 See Chemerinsky, supra note 189, at 2 ("The lessons to be learned from the abuses of
the Whitewater special counsel should be about how to reform the law, not why to end it.").
201 See David A. Strauss, The Independent Counsel Statute: What Went Wrong?, 51 AD-
MIN. L. REv. 651, 652 (1999) ("You simply cannot have a criminal prosecutor, with so much
power, subject to such limited checks."); see also Rappaport, supra note 185, at 1600-01
("[One] problem is that independent counsels exercise significant discretion but are not ac-
countable to the electorate. Independent counsels perform important duties that involve a sub-
stantial amount of policymaking discretion, including deciding whether certain conduct by an
official warrants an indictment. In a democracy, persons who exercise such discretion are
generally made accountable to the public. . . . Independent counsels, however, have virtually
no accountability because they are appointed by judges, take orders from no one, and can be
removed only for cause.. .. The Independent Counsel's lack of accountability is not merely a
problem of democratic theory, but also of democratic practice. Because the Independent
Counsel is unconstrained by the fundamental democratic check on policymaking-having to
stand for election-there is a significant danger that she will behave unreasonably. The Inde-
pendent Counsel's lack of accountability also deprives her of the political legitimacy that is
crucial to the performance of her duties.").
202 Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice, supra note 170; see also Brett
M. Kavanaugh, The President and the Independent Counsel, 86 GEO. L.J. 2133, 2145-49
(1998) (suggesting that the President appoint the independent counsel subject to Senate
confirmation).
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general appointed by the President or Congress for a fixed term of
years. 203 An alternative proposal calls for congressional appointment of
a special prosecutor with the exclusive purpose to investigate allegations
of criminal behavior in the Executive Branch.204 In either system, the
appointing body would be directly responsible to the electorate in a way
the Special Division, which allowed Starr to run amuck, was not.2 0 5
To have a truly "independent" counsel, an improved system must
not grant the Attorney General and the President the power to appoint
and remove the prosecutor or define her jurisdiction. The Attorney Gen-
eral's power in these areas undermined the independence of the prosecu-
tion under the Independent Counsel Act. Misuse of this power is easy to
imagine when considering the Bush Administration's refusal to follow
torture laws or cooperate with legislative and judicial attempts to regulate
its practices. The President could simply instruct the Attorney General to
refuse to initiate appointment of independent counsel even in the face of
calls for one by less self-interested observers. 206 Indeed, for President
Clinton, the take-home lesson from the Starr investigations was not that
the independent counsel overstepped his bounds, but that Clinton should
have never allowed his Attorney General to request an independent coun-
sel in the first place. 207
While this may be a legitimate lesson to take from the Starr era if
one is interested chiefly in the friction-free exercise of presidential
power, the reality of presidential inaction to remedy executive abuses is
203 See Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice, supra note 170.
204 See id. This proposal bears a resemblance to Michael Rappaport's later suggestion to
endow a new congressional investigative committee with additional subpoena powers and
equip it with a professional investigative staff to review and expose Executive Branch miscon-
duct. See Rappaport, supra note 185, at 1586; infra note 207 and accompanying text.
205 A practical challenge to legislation that removes the Executive Branch entirely from
the independent counsel appointment and review process is that the Supreme Court cited these
very oversight provisions as justification for upholding the constitutionality of the Independent
Counsel Act in Morrison. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988). Even though it
appears that the framers intended the Attorney General to be a weak office and did not envi-
sion a great deal of presidential control over federal prosecution, the Morrison reasoning
would argue for an executive-appointed, fixed-term attorney general over a congressionally-
appointed prosecutor. See id. at 694; supra notes 113-18; see also Free Enterprise Fund v.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2009) (distinguishing Morri-
son and Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) in finding that the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act's creation of a Public Company Accounting Oversight Board contradicts
Article II's vesting of the executive power in the President by conferring executive power on
Board members without subjecting them to Presidential control).
206 See Chemerinsky, supra note 189, at 6.
207 See TAYLOR BRANCH, THE CLINTON TAPES: WREsTLINo HISToRY WITH THE PRESI-
DENT 428 (2009) (paraphrasing Clinton as saying that he "had been a fool to establish the
Whitewater special prosecutor"); see also Boa WOODWARD, THE CHOICE: How CLINTON WON
444 (2005) (quoting Clinton as telling 1996 election opponent, Sen. Bob Dole, who had op-
posed reauthorization of the Independent Counsel Act, "You were right and I was wrong on
the independent counsel.").
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anathema to a government built on a system of checks and balances.
Though the Starr investigations showed that a truly independent counsel
can lead to plenty of friction and inefficiencies in Executive Branch ac-
tivities, the country's founders sought to create such structural impedi-
ments to the ambitions of any one branch of government.208 Reacting to
the Starr investigation's flaws by removing independent prosecutorial
oversight of the Executive Branch was shortsighted. The better solution
is for Congress to revive and redesign the independent counsel structure.
C. Breaking up the Prosecutorial Monopoly: Alternatives for
Pursuing Executive Branch Misconduct
An alternative to removing the prosecutorial power over the federal
Executive Branch from the President-controlled Attorney General is to
introduce competition to the heretofore monopoly power to pursue and
punish Executive Branch members misdeeds. Economists would expect
such competition to lead to a higher number of prosecutions of Executive
Branch members and decrease the incentives for Executive Branch lead-
ers to influence the dominant method of prosecution. 209 Four alterna-
tives for breaking up the current prosecutorial monopoly will be
considered briefly here: (i) increasing the capacity of victims to punish
Executive Branch misconduct, (ii) pursuing ethical complaints against
Attorneys General and their attorney staff who show favoritism toward
possible prosecution targets, (iii) bolstering the power of congressional
or internal government investigations, and (iv) initiating criminal charges
against Executive Branch leaders by international or independent local
prosecutors.
1. Victim-Initiated Actions Against Executive Branch Officials
Several alleged victims of Bush Administration-sanctioned torture
have sought justice in the civil arena but have not yet prevailed on the
merits of their claims. For example, Maher Arar, a Syrian-born Cana-
dian citizen, brought suit against former Attorney General John Ashcroft,
FBI Director Robert Mueller, former Secretary of Homeland Security
Tom Ridge, and various U.S. immigration officials for participation in
his "rendition" to Syria where he was interrogated, tortured, and ulti-
mately released without charges.210 The Eastern District of New York
dismissed Arar's suit alleging violations of the Torture Victims Protec-
208 See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 109, at 321-22 (James Madison) ("Ambition
must be made to counteract ambition."); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 189, at 2 ("This
tension between independence and accountability is not unique to the debate over the indepen-
dent counsel law. Quite the contrary, it is at the core of countless constitutional issues.").
209 See van Aaken et al., supra note 131, at 9.
210 Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2009).
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tion Act, the Fifth Amendment, and international law.2 1 1 The Second
Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld the dismissal in late 2009 by ruling that
there was no cognizable civil remedy for a victim of rendition.212 An-
other torture litigant still awaits resolution of his suit: Jose Padilla, held
under the designation of "enemy combatant" in solitary confinement for
more than three years in Charleston, S.C., sued Bush Department of Jus-
tice official and torture memoranda author, John Yoo, for actions that
Padilla claims led to his torture. 213 In 2009, the Northern District Court
of California rejected Yoo's claim of qualified immunity and allowed
Padilla's suit to go forward. 214
Even if these or other suits succeed in obtaining significant civil
remedies against Executive Branch officials, they are best viewed as a
supplement to, rather than a replacement for, criminal prosecution.
Those who remember the images of high-profile defendant O.J. Simpson
smiling on the golf course or cavorting in Las Vegas after being found
civilly liable, but criminally acquitted, for two deaths 215 can attest to the
significant gap in punitive impact between civil and criminal liability.216
In the context of torture, the CIA Inspector General reported that the
agents involved in the torture of detainees were extremely concerned
about the potential for criminal prosecution of their activities. 217 Al-
though that concern did not prevent torture from occurring, it is certainly
possible the activities would have been more brutal but for the fear of
211 See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 250, 287-88 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
212 See id. at 580-81.
213 Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1012-14 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
214 See id. at 1038. A torture-related case that does not name government officials as
defendants is Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009) amended and
superseded by 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009). In Jeppesen Dataplan, five foreign nationals-
who allegedly had been transferred in secret to foreign countries for detention and interroga-
tion pursuant to the "extraordinary rendition" program operated by Central Intelligence
Agency-sued under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, against Jeppesen, a Boeing
subsidiary company alleged to have taken part in the program. See Jeppesen Dataplan, 563
F.3d at 997. Before Jeppesen filed an answer to the complaint, the United States intervened,
asserting that the state secrets privilege required dismissal of the entire action on the pleadings.
Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court dismissal of the
complaint. See id.
215 See generally Brown v. Simpson, No. SC036876 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 1997),
available at http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/civil (follow "case summary" hyperlink and enter
"SC036876" into the appropriate search field) (providing basic procedural information about
the case); Goldman v. Simpson, No. SC036340 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 1, 1995), available at
http://www.lasuperiorcourt.org/civil (follow "case summary" hyperlink and enter "SC036340"
into the appropriate search field) (providing basic procedural information about the case)
(same basic information provided); see also JEFFERY TOOBIN, THE RuN OF His LIFE: THE
PEOPLE V. O.J. SIMPSON 444-58 (1997) (discussing the civil charges filed against Simpson).
216 Simpson was subsequently convicted and imprisoned for armed robbery in Nevada.
See O.J. Simpson Sentenced to Long Prison Term, MSNBC.com, Dec. 5, 2008, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28067187/.
217 CIA OIG REP., supra note 4, at 94, 101.
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criminal sanctions, or that the torture would have been significantly re-
duced or even absent if the Department of Justice had not issued approv-
ing legal opinions in advance. 218
Beyond the deterrence aspect of potential prosecution for official
misconduct,219 the larger question remains: In a system where no person
is supposed to be above the law, why should Executive Branch leaders
be subject to mere civil liability for acts that would likely result in im-
prisonment for others? Precedent does in fact exist for allowing victims
of crimes to transcend the limitations of a civil remedy by pursuing crim-
inal charges. At the time of the founding of the United States, several
states still followed the English tradition of allowing private citizens to
initiate criminal prosecutions.220 While victim-initiated prosecution is
not allowed in the United States today, in some European systems, vic-
tims may file and pursue criminal charges.221 In Spain, even non-victims
can lead a criminal prosecution. 222 Allowing public interest groups to
file and pursue criminal charges may be ideal in the context of official
misconduct, as the harm caused is more likely to be widespread and
generalized. 223
2. Pursuit of Ethical Complaints Against Attorneys General and
Department of Justice Officials
Bringing ethical charges against federal officials provides another
avenue to police Executive Branch abuses. Because the Attorney Gen-
eral and high-level members of the Department of Justice practice law in
the nation's capital, they are subject to the Washington, D.C. Rules of
Professional Conduct.224 Failure to prosecute Executive Branch officials
for misconduct because of political ties may run afoul of Washington
218 See, e.g., Harold G. Gramsick & Robert J. Bursik, Conscience, Significant Others, and
Rational Choices: Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 837, 839-40
(1990) (citing research showing that potential sanctions have no deterrent effect if the rational
actor perceives little or no probability of punishment being imposed.).
219 See van Aaken et al., supra note 131.
220 See S. MILsOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 404 (2d ed. 1981);
Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 COR-
NELL L. REV. 260, 283 (1995).
221 See MARION E. BRIENEN & ERNESTINE H. HOEGEN, VICTIMS OF CRIME IN 22 EURO-
PEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMs 1064-65 (2000).
222 Id.
223 See van Aaken et al., supra note 131, at 9.
224 See, e.g., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNC-
TON STD. 3-1.2 (3d ed., 1993), available at http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/prosecu-
tionfunction.pdf; cf Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by the OLC Torture Memorandum,
1 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 455, 464 (2005) [hereinafter Clark, Ethical Issues] (noting
that Jay Bybee and John Yoo were subject to the Washington, D.C. Rules of Professional
Conduct at the time they authored the "Torture Memos"); Marc Stepper, Note, A Government
Lawyer's Liability Under Bivens, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (forthcoming Feb. 2011)
(noting that actors like Yoo, who was characterized by one court as the "de facto head of war-
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D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct 3.8 which states, "The prosecutor in
a criminal case shall not: (a) In exercising discretion to investigate or to
prosecute, improperly favor or invidiously discriminate against any per-
sons." 2 2 5 Thus, federal attorneys who drag their heels in prosecuting the
Executive Branch should be subject to discipline for violation of the pro-
fessional ethics rules.2 2 6
The Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), an internal ethics
unit within the Justice Department, may assist in Executive Branch disci-
plinary measures as well. In the wake of the revelation of Bush Admin-
istration torture activities, some have called for disciplinary actions
against former Department of Justice officials and torture memoranda
authors John Yoo, now a law professor at University of California Berke-
ley, and Jay Bybee, now a federal judge in Nevada. 227 A pending opin-
ion by the OPR reportedly includes a referral to state bar associations to
consider possible actions against Yoo and Bybee.228
Unfortunately, the pursuit of ethical charges against an Attorney
General or top Justice Department official, like bringing civil claims, is a
legitimate but insufficient response to Executive Branch misconduct.
Such ethical charges against attorney torture enablers are certainly justi-
fied and may well inspire future government attorneys to hold them-
selves to a higher standard of behavior. However, professional ethics
complaints alone do not address the need to hold Executive Branch offi-
cials to the same level of impartial prosecutorial oversight as other citi-
zens who are subject to criminal sanctions for violations of clear legal
mandates.
3. Greater Investigative Power for Congress or an Inspector
General
To remedy the conflict of interest present in Executive Branch pros-
ecution, some scholars have called for oversight by other government
officials. Professor Michael Rappaport has suggested creating a new
on-terrorism legal issues," often see their recommendations implemented directly into execu-
tive policy).
225 DisTmIcT OF COLUMBIA RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 3.8(a) (2007), available at
http://www.dcbar.org/forlawyers/ethics/legal-ethics/rules-ofprofessionalconduct/
amendedrules/rulethree/rule03_08.cfm.
226 See Viggiano, supra note 38, at 1200-01.
227 Clark, Ethical Issues, supra note 224, at 464; see also BuelahMan, National Lawyer's
Guild Says John Yoo Is a War Criminal, BUELAHMAN'S REVOLT BLOG (Apr. 9, 2008), http://
buelahman.wordpress.com/2008/04/09/national-lawyers-guild-says-john-yoo-is-a-war-crimi-
nal/ (reposting Press Release, National Lawyers Guild Calls On Boalt Hall To Dismiss Law
Professor John Yoo, Whose Torture Memos Led to Commission of War Crimes (Apr. 9,
2008)).
228 David Johnston & Scott Shane, Torture Memos: Inquiry Suggests No Prosecutions,
N.Y. TtDEs, May 6, 2009, at Al.
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congressional investigative committee with additional subpoena powers
and a professional investigative staff to review and expose Executive
Branch misconduct.229 Professor Kathleen Clark has proposed establish-
ing a permanent inspector general within the White House empowered to
investigate Executive Branch wrongdoing and report to Congress.230
Both proposals have their strengths: Rappaport's proposal would make
the investigative body more accountable to the electorate, 231 thus reme-
dying a major flaw of the Independent Counsel Act, and Clark's proposal
would place a quasi-independent investigator on the scene of the Execu-
tive Branch activities. 232 Neither solution, however, goes far enough to-
wards holding executive officials truly accountable, because they do not
allow for prosecution of criminal acts. This prosecution is an essential
component of a system promising that no person, not even the President,
is above the law.
4. Non-federal Prosecution of Executive Branch Crimes
Domestic and international actors, frustrated with the lack of U.S.
investigation and prosecution of Bush Administration misdeeds, have
looked to international courts. 233 To date, this strategy has produced lim-
ited, positive results. In 2009, Baltasar Garz6n, a Spanish judge known
for his prosecutions of alleged international human rights abusers such as
Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet,234 launched a criminal investigation
of Bush Administration officials for torture by citing the Geneva Con-
ventions and the 1984 Convention Against Torture as the legal basis for
the investigation.235 In 2006, the Center for Constitutional Rights, a
U.S.-based human rights organization, and other organizations requested
that a German judge issue an indictment against Bush Administration
229 See Rappaport, supra note 185, at 1595-97.
230 See Kathleen Clark, Toward More Ethical Government: An Inspector General for the
White House, 49 MERCER L. REv. 553, 560-61 (1998) [hereinafter Clark, Ethical
Government].
231 See Rappaport, supra note 185, at 1597.
232 See Clark, Ethical Government, supra note 230, at 564.
233 Such international prosecution may be the result of U.S. efforts to immunize torture-
implicated officials from domestic prosecution. See Sands, supra note 24, at 370 (internal
cross-reference omitted) (quoting a European prosecutor as saying it was "very stupid" of the
United States to attempt to provide immunity in the Military Commissions Act of 2006, as this
provides a justification for foreign prosecutors to pursue charges in their own jurisdictions).
234 See Clifford Krauss, Britain Arrests Pinochet to Face Charges by Spain, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 18, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/26/world/argentine-ex-leader-s-arrest-is-
sought.html?ref=baltasar-garzon.
235 Marlise Simons, Spanish Court Weighs Inquiry on Torture for 6 Bush-Era Officials,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/29/worldleurope/29spain.html.
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officials for similar crimes,236 but that request was denied.237 In 2009,
an Italian judge convicted in absentia twenty-three Americans, mostly
CIA operatives, of kidnapping a Muslim cleric from the streets of Milan
and transporting him to Egypt where the cleric claims he was interro-
gated and tortured as part of the U.S. practice of rendition. 238 Although
such cases garner international attention and may have received a boost
from U.S. efforts to provide immunity for torturers, 239 it is unclear
whether any of these actual or possible prosecutions will result in the
imposition of prison sentences or other penalties. 240
To date, the protection that U.S. Executive Branch officials enjoy in
the international arena has been replicated at the local level due to the
uniquely non-local nature of prosecution in Washington, D.C. If an Ex-
ecutive Branch leader were to commit a criminal act in Maryland, Vir-
ginia, Indianapolis, or Indiana, a locally-elected prosecuting attorney
would likely prosecute the crime.241 But that is not the case in the Dis-
trict of Columbia where the U.S. Attorney's office, ultimately accounta-
ble to the President, prosecutes felony crimes under the D.C. Code.2 4 2
Thus, although the D.C. Code contains provisions that could apply to
Executive Branch official misconduct including obstruction of justice243
and bribery,244 the same conflicts of interest inherent in federal prosecu-
tion make pursuing those charges at the local level quite unlikely.
However, District of Columbia officials 245 and legal scholars246
have argued that the responsibility for local criminal prosecution be
236 Mark Landler, Rumsfeld Faces War Crimes Suit in Germany, INT'L HER. TRIB., Nov.
14, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/14/world/americas/14iht-rumsfeld.3532840.html.
237 Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart [Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart], Apr. 21, 2009, at 3
(Ger.), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Beschluss%200LG%2OStuttgart.pdf. For a list
of documents submitted in that case, see German War Crimes Complaint Against Donald
Rumsfeld et al., CENTER FOR CONST. RTs., http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/german-
war-crimes-complaint-against-donald-rumsfeld-et-a (last visited Oct. 25, 2010).
238 See, e.g., Rachel Donadio, Italy Convicts 23 Americans, Most Working for CIA, of
Abducting Muslim Cleric, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2009, at A14-15.
239 See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Court Dismisses A Case Asserting Torture by CI.A., N.Y.
TIms, Sep. 9, 2010 at Al (noting that the Obama Administration successfully argued that
prisoners of the CIA could not sue over the alleged torture in overseas prisons because such a
lawsuit might expose secret government information).
240 See Sands, supra note 24, at 370-71.
241 See Rasmusen et al., supra note 149, at 49.
242 D.C. CODE § 23-101(c) (2001).
243 Id. § 22-722.
244 Id. § 22-713.
245 See PR 12-671, SENSE OF THE COUNCIL REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN OF-
FICE OF THE ATrORNEY GENEFAL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RESOLUTION OF 1998, availa-
ble at DC Watch Archives, DC WATCH, http://www.dcwatch.com/archives/councill2/12-
671.htm.
246 See John Payton, Should the District of Columbia Have Responsibility for the Prose-
cution of Criminal Offenses Arising Under the District of Columbia Code?, 11 U. D.C. L. REv.
35, 37 (2008) ("Democracy supplies an important check on the exercise of a prosecutor's
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placed with a District of Columbia governmental entity. Eleanor Holmes
Norton, the Congresswoman representing the District of Columbia, has
introduced legislation to establish an Office of District Attorney for the
District of Columbia to be headed by a locally elected district attor-
ney.2 4 7 This bill has both the philosophical advantage of being aligned
with the framers' preference for local law enforcement over federal po-
lice and prosecution 248 and the more tangible advantage of being aligned
with statements made by President Obama, a co-sponsor of the District
of Columbia Voting Rights Act of 2007 that was designed to provide the
District with greater self-rule.249 Should the Voting Rights Act become
law, it would bust the federal monopoly over prosecution of executive
officials and align Washington with the fifty states of the union where
local prosecution is more the rule than the exception.
CONCLusION
Due to a conflict of interest as blatant as the proverbial fox guarding
the henhouse, two consecutive Presidents and their attorneys general
have declined to investigate or prosecute Executive Branch activities
sanctioning torture. If the United States is to live up to its aspiration to
be a government of laws and not men, this structural flaw must be reme-
died. The direct election of an attorney general is the most precise and
effective remedy for this flaw. But the revival and improvement of the
independent counsel, or else the enactment of provisions to break up the
current monopoly over Executive Branch prosecution, are also vastly
preferable to leaving in place a system that flouts the principles of equal
justice and ignores checks on individual power.
discretion. Democracy helps ensure that the criminal laws reflect the concerns and values of
the community. This democratic accountability of the prosecutorial function is not present in
the District.").
247 District of Columbia District Attorney Establishment Act of 2007, H.R. 1296, 110th
Cong. § 2(a) (2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=
110_cong-bills&docid=f:hl296ih.txt.pdf.
248 See Bloch, supra note 112, at 568.
249 District of Columbia House Voting Rights Act of 2007, S. 1257, 110th Cong. (2007),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl10:SN01257:@@@P; see also Justin
Ewers, D.C. Voting Rights Supporters Have Best Shot Yet with Obama in the White House,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 8, 2009, http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/politics/2009/
0 1/08/dc-voting-rights-supporters-have-best-shot-yet-with-obama-in-the-white-house.html.
The House of Representatives passed the Act in 2007 and the Senate passed it in 2009. See
Dem: No Vote on D.C. Voting Rights Act this Year, MSNBC.com, Apr. 20, 2010, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36665822/. However, the Senate version contained an amendment
regarding the District's gun control laws, and so was sent back to the House of Representa-
tives. See id.

